Elastic Integrations

Endpoint Security

Protect your hosts with threat prevention, detection, and deep security data visibility.

Last updated on September 7th, 2021.

What's an integration?

This integration is powered by Elastic Agent. Elastic Agent is a single, unified agent that you can deploy to hosts or containers to collect data and send it to the Elastic Stack. Behind the scenes, Elastic Agent runs the Beats shippers or Elastic Endpoint required for your configuration. Please refer to our documentation for a detailed comparison between Beats and Elastic Agent.

Prefer to use Beats for this use case? See Filebeat modules for logs or Metricbeat modules for metrics.

Overview

This integration sets up templates and index patterns required for Endpoint Security.

Compatibility

For compatibility information view our documentation.

Logs

The log type of documents are stored in the logs-endpoint.* indices. The following sections define the mapped fields sent by the endpoint.

alerts

Exported fields

FieldDescriptionType
@timestamp
Date/time when the event originated. This is the date/time extracted from the event, typically representing when the event was generated by the source. If the event source has no original timestamp, this value is typically populated by the first time the event was received by the pipeline. Required field for all events.
date
Endpoint.policy
The policy fields are used to hold information about applied policy.
object
Endpoint.policy.applied
information about the policy that is applied
object
Endpoint.policy.applied.id
the id of the applied policy
keyword
Endpoint.policy.applied.name
the name of this applied policy
keyword
Endpoint.policy.applied.status
the status of the applied policy
keyword
Endpoint.policy.applied.version
the version of this applied policy
keyword
Events
events array
object
Memory_protection.cross_session
Is this process injecting across operating system sessions?
boolean
Memory_protection.feature
Memory Protection feature which triggered the alert.
keyword
Memory_protection.parent_to_child
Is this process injecting into its child?
boolean
Memory_protection.self_injection
Is this alert about a process injecting into itself?
boolean
Memory_protection.thread_count
The number of threads that this alert applies to. If several alerts occur in a short period of time, they can be combined into a single alert with thread_count > 1.
long
Memory_protection.unique_key_v1
A unique key created by hashing several characteristics of this alert.
keyword
Ransomware.child_processes.executable
Absolute path to the process executable.
keyword
Ransomware.child_processes.feature
Ransomware feature which triggered the alert.
keyword
Ransomware.child_processes.files
Information about each file event attributed to the ransomware. Expected to be an array.
nested
Ransomware.child_processes.files.data
File header or MBR bytes.
binary
Ransomware.child_processes.files.entropy
Entropy of file contents.
double
Ransomware.child_processes.files.extension
File extension, excluding the leading dot.
keyword
Ransomware.child_processes.files.metrics
Suspicious ransomware behaviours associated with the file event.
keyword
Ransomware.child_processes.files.operation
Operation applied to file.
keyword
Ransomware.child_processes.files.original.extension
Original file extension prior to the file event.
keyword
Ransomware.child_processes.files.original.path
Original file path prior to the file event.
keyword
Ransomware.child_processes.files.path
Full path to the file, including the file name.
keyword
Ransomware.child_processes.files.score
Ransomware score for this particular file event.
double
Ransomware.child_processes.pid
Process id.
long
Ransomware.child_processes.score
Total ransomware score for aggregated file events.
double
Ransomware.child_processes.version
Ransomware artifact version.
keyword
Ransomware.executable
Absolute path to the process executable.
keyword
Ransomware.feature
Ransomware feature which triggered the alert.
keyword
Ransomware.files
Information about each file event attributed to the ransomware. Expected to be an array.
nested
Ransomware.files.data
File header or MBR bytes.
binary
Ransomware.files.entropy
Entropy of file contents.
double
Ransomware.files.extension
File extension, excluding the leading dot.
keyword
Ransomware.files.metrics
Suspicious ransomware behaviours associated with the file event.
keyword
Ransomware.files.operation
Operation applied to file.
keyword
Ransomware.files.original.extension
Original file extension prior to the file event.
keyword
Ransomware.files.original.path
Original file path prior to the file event.
keyword
Ransomware.files.path
Full path to the file, including the file name.
keyword
Ransomware.files.score
Ransomware score for this particular file event.
double
Ransomware.pid
Process id.
long
Ransomware.score
Total ransomware score for aggregated file events.
double
Ransomware.version
Ransomware artifact version.
keyword
Responses.@timestamp
timestamp in which action was taken
date
Responses.action
dictionary representing requested response action
nested
Responses.action.action
response action name
keyword
Responses.action.field
field in the triggering event to use as input for action
text
Responses.action.state
index of event in events array to use for field lookup
long
Responses.message
result message
text
Responses.process
dictionary representing process information
nested
Responses.process.entity_id
entity id of actionable process
text
Responses.process.name
name of actionable process
keyword
Responses.process.pid
pid of actionable process
long
Responses.result
response action result code
long
Target.dll.Ext
Object for all custom defined fields to live in.
object
Target.dll.Ext.code_signature
Nested version of ECS code_signature fieldset.
nested
Target.dll.Ext.code_signature.exists
Boolean to capture if a signature is present.
boolean
Target.dll.Ext.code_signature.status
Additional information about the certificate status. This is useful for logging cryptographic errors with the certificate validity or trust status. Leave unpopulated if the validity or trust of the certificate was unchecked.
keyword
Target.dll.Ext.code_signature.subject_name
Subject name of the code signer
keyword
Target.dll.Ext.code_signature.trusted
Stores the trust status of the certificate chain. Validating the trust of the certificate chain may be complicated, and this field should only be populated by tools that actively check the status.
boolean
Target.dll.Ext.code_signature.valid
Boolean to capture if the digital signature is verified against the binary content. Leave unpopulated if a certificate was unchecked.
boolean
Target.dll.Ext.compile_time
Timestamp from when the module was compiled.
date
Target.dll.Ext.malware_classification.identifier
The model's unique identifier.
keyword
Target.dll.Ext.malware_classification.score
The score produced by the classification model.
double
Target.dll.Ext.malware_classification.threshold
The score threshold for the model. Files that score above this threshold are considered malicious.
double
Target.dll.Ext.malware_classification.upx_packed
Whether UPX packing was detected.
boolean
Target.dll.Ext.malware_classification.version
The version of the model used.
keyword
Target.dll.Ext.mapped_address
The base address where this module is loaded.
unsigned_long
Target.dll.Ext.mapped_size
The size of this module's memory mapping, in bytes.
unsigned_long
Target.dll.hash.md5
MD5 hash.
keyword
Target.dll.hash.sha1
SHA1 hash.
keyword
Target.dll.hash.sha256
SHA256 hash.
keyword
Target.dll.hash.sha512
SHA512 hash.
keyword
Target.dll.name
Name of the library. This generally maps to the name of the file on disk.
keyword
Target.dll.path
Full file path of the library.
keyword
Target.dll.pe.company
Internal company name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
Target.dll.pe.description
Internal description of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
Target.dll.pe.file_version
Internal version of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
Target.dll.pe.imphash
A hash of the imports in a PE file. An imphash -- or import hash -- can be used to fingerprint binaries even after recompilation or other code-level transformations have occurred, which would change more traditional hash values. Learn more at https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/01/tracking-malware-import-hashing.html.
keyword
Target.dll.pe.original_file_name
Internal name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
Target.dll.pe.product
Internal product name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
Target.process.Ext
Object for all custom defined fields to live in.
object
Target.process.Ext.ancestry
An array of entity_ids indicating the ancestors for this event
keyword
Target.process.Ext.architecture
Process architecture. It can differ from host architecture.
keyword
Target.process.Ext.authentication_id
Process authentication ID
keyword
Target.process.Ext.code_signature
Nested version of ECS code_signature fieldset.
nested
Target.process.Ext.code_signature.exists
Boolean to capture if a signature is present.
boolean
Target.process.Ext.code_signature.status
Additional information about the certificate status. This is useful for logging cryptographic errors with the certificate validity or trust status. Leave unpopulated if the validity or trust of the certificate was unchecked.
keyword
Target.process.Ext.code_signature.subject_name
Subject name of the code signer
keyword
Target.process.Ext.code_signature.trusted
Stores the trust status of the certificate chain. Validating the trust of the certificate chain may be complicated, and this field should only be populated by tools that actively check the status.
boolean
Target.process.Ext.code_signature.valid
Boolean to capture if the digital signature is verified against the binary content. Leave unpopulated if a certificate was unchecked.
boolean
Target.process.Ext.dll.Ext
Object for all custom defined fields to live in.
object
Target.process.Ext.dll.Ext.code_signature
Nested version of ECS code_signature fieldset.
nested
Target.process.Ext.dll.Ext.code_signature.exists
Boolean to capture if a signature is present.
boolean
Target.process.Ext.dll.Ext.code_signature.status
Additional information about the certificate status. This is useful for logging cryptographic errors with the certificate validity or trust status. Leave unpopulated if the validity or trust of the certificate was unchecked.
keyword
Target.process.Ext.dll.Ext.code_signature.subject_name
Subject name of the code signer
keyword
Target.process.Ext.dll.Ext.code_signature.trusted
Stores the trust status of the certificate chain. Validating the trust of the certificate chain may be complicated, and this field should only be populated by tools that actively check the status.
boolean
Target.process.Ext.dll.Ext.code_signature.valid
Boolean to capture if the digital signature is verified against the binary content. Leave unpopulated if a certificate was unchecked.
boolean
Target.process.Ext.dll.Ext.compile_time
Timestamp from when the module was compiled.
date
Target.process.Ext.dll.Ext.mapped_address
The base address where this module is loaded.
unsigned_long
Target.process.Ext.dll.Ext.mapped_size
The size of this module's memory mapping, in bytes.
unsigned_long
Target.process.Ext.dll.hash.md5
MD5 hash.
keyword
Target.process.Ext.dll.hash.sha1
SHA1 hash.
keyword
Target.process.Ext.dll.hash.sha256
SHA256 hash.
keyword
Target.process.Ext.dll.hash.sha512
SHA512 hash.
keyword
Target.process.Ext.dll.name
Name of the library. This generally maps to the name of the file on disk.
keyword
Target.process.Ext.dll.path
Full file path of the library.
keyword
Target.process.Ext.dll.pe.company
Internal company name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
Target.process.Ext.dll.pe.description
Internal description of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
Target.process.Ext.dll.pe.file_version
Internal version of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
Target.process.Ext.dll.pe.imphash
A hash of the imports in a PE file. An imphash -- or import hash -- can be used to fingerprint binaries even after recompilation or other code-level transformations have occurred, which would change more traditional hash values. Learn more at https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/01/tracking-malware-import-hashing.html.
keyword
Target.process.Ext.dll.pe.original_file_name
Internal name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
Target.process.Ext.dll.pe.product
Internal product name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
Target.process.Ext.malware_classification.identifier
The model's unique identifier.
keyword
Target.process.Ext.malware_classification.score
The score produced by the classification model.
double
Target.process.Ext.malware_classification.threshold
The score threshold for the model. Files that score above this threshold are considered malicious.
double
Target.process.Ext.malware_classification.upx_packed
Whether UPX packing was detected.
boolean
Target.process.Ext.malware_classification.version
The version of the model used.
keyword
Target.process.Ext.memory_region.allocation_base
Base address of the memory allocation containing the memory region.
unsigned_long
Target.process.Ext.memory_region.allocation_protection
Original memory protection requested when the memory was allocated. Example values include "RWX" and "R-X".
keyword
Target.process.Ext.memory_region.allocation_size
Original memory size requested when the memory was allocated.
unsigned_long
Target.process.Ext.memory_region.allocation_type
The memory allocation type. Example values include "IMAGE", "MAPPED", and "PRIVATE".
keyword
Target.process.Ext.memory_region.bytes_address
The address where bytes_compressed begins.
unsigned_long
Target.process.Ext.memory_region.bytes_allocation_offset
Offset of bytes_address the memory allocation. Equal to bytes_address - allocation_base.
unsigned_long
Target.process.Ext.memory_region.bytes_compressed
Up to 4MB of raw data from the memory allocation. This is compressed with zlib.To reduce data volume, this is de-duplicated on the endpoint, and may be missing from many alerts if the same data would be sent multiple times.
keyword
Target.process.Ext.memory_region.bytes_compressed_present
Whether bytes_compressed is present in this event.
boolean
Target.process.Ext.memory_region.malware_signature.all_names
A sequence of signature names matched.
keyword
Target.process.Ext.memory_region.malware_signature.primary
The first matching details.
object
Target.process.Ext.memory_region.malware_signature.primary.signature.id
The id of the first yara rule matched.
keyword
Target.process.Ext.memory_region.malware_signature.primary.signature.name
The name of the first yara rule matched.
keyword
Target.process.Ext.memory_region.mapped_pe.company
Internal company name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
Target.process.Ext.memory_region.mapped_pe.description
Internal description of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
Target.process.Ext.memory_region.mapped_pe.file_version
Internal version of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
Target.process.Ext.memory_region.mapped_pe.imphash
A hash of the imports in a PE file. An imphash -- or import hash -- can be used to fingerprint binaries even after recompilation or other code-level transformations have occurred, which would change more traditional hash values. Learn more at https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/01/tracking-malware-import-hashing.html.
keyword
Target.process.Ext.memory_region.mapped_pe.original_file_name
Internal name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
Target.process.Ext.memory_region.mapped_pe.product
Internal product name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
Target.process.Ext.memory_region.mapped_pe_detected
Whether the file at mapped_path is an executable.
boolean
Target.process.Ext.memory_region.memory_pe.company
Internal company name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
Target.process.Ext.memory_region.memory_pe.description
Internal description of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
Target.process.Ext.memory_region.memory_pe.file_version
Internal version of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
Target.process.Ext.memory_region.memory_pe.imphash
A hash of the imports in a PE file. An imphash -- or import hash -- can be used to fingerprint binaries even after recompilation or other code-level transformations have occurred, which would change more traditional hash values. Learn more at https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/01/tracking-malware-import-hashing.html.
keyword
Target.process.Ext.memory_region.memory_pe.original_file_name
Internal name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
Target.process.Ext.memory_region.memory_pe.product
Internal product name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
Target.process.Ext.memory_region.memory_pe_detected
Whether an executable file was found in memory.
boolean
Target.process.Ext.memory_region.region_base
Base address of the memory region.
unsigned_long
Target.process.Ext.memory_region.region_protection
Memory protection of the memory region. Example values include "RWX" and "R-X".
keyword
Target.process.Ext.memory_region.region_size
Size of the memory region.
unsigned_long
Target.process.Ext.memory_region.region_state
State of the memory region. Example values include "RESERVE", "COMMIT", and "FREE".
keyword
Target.process.Ext.memory_region.strings
Array of strings found within the memory region.
keyword
Target.process.Ext.protection
Indicates the protection level of this process. Uses the same syntax as Process Explorer. Examples include PsProtectedSignerWinTcb, PsProtectedSignerWinTcb-Light, and PsProtectedSignerWindows-Light.
keyword
Target.process.Ext.services
Services running in this process.
keyword
Target.process.Ext.session
Session information for the current process
keyword
Target.process.Ext.token.domain
Domain of token user.
keyword
Target.process.Ext.token.elevation
Whether the token is elevated or not
boolean
Target.process.Ext.token.elevation_type
What level of elevation the token has
keyword
Target.process.Ext.token.impersonation_level
Impersonation level. Only valid for impersonation tokens.
keyword
Target.process.Ext.token.integrity_level
Numeric integrity level.
long
Target.process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name
Human readable integrity level.
keyword
Target.process.Ext.token.is_appcontainer
Whether or not this is an appcontainer token.
boolean
Target.process.Ext.token.privileges
Array describing the privileges associated with the token.
nested
Target.process.Ext.token.privileges.description
Description of the privilege.
keyword
Target.process.Ext.token.privileges.enabled
Whether or not the privilege is enabled.
boolean
Target.process.Ext.token.privileges.name
Name of the privilege.
keyword
Target.process.Ext.token.sid
Token user's Security Identifier (SID).
keyword
Target.process.Ext.token.type
Type of the token, either primary or impersonation.
keyword
Target.process.Ext.token.user
Username of token owner.
keyword
Target.process.Ext.user
User associated with the running process.
keyword
Target.process.args
Array of process arguments, starting with the absolute path to the executable. May be filtered to protect sensitive information.
keyword
Target.process.args_count
Length of the process.args array. This field can be useful for querying or performing bucket analysis on how many arguments were provided to start a process. More arguments may be an indication of suspicious activity.
long
Target.process.command_line
Full command line that started the process, including the absolute path to the executable, and all arguments. Some arguments may be filtered to protect sensitive information.
keyword
Target.process.entity_id
Unique identifier for the process. The implementation of this is specified by the data source, but some examples of what could be used here are a process-generated UUID, Sysmon Process GUIDs, or a hash of some uniquely identifying components of a process. Constructing a globally unique identifier is a common practice to mitigate PID reuse as well as to identify a specific process over time, across multiple monitored hosts.
keyword
Target.process.executable
Absolute path to the process executable.
keyword
Target.process.exit_code
The exit code of the process, if this is a termination event. The field should be absent if there is no exit code for the event (e.g. process start).
long
Target.process.hash.md5
MD5 hash.
keyword
Target.process.hash.sha1
SHA1 hash.
keyword
Target.process.hash.sha256
SHA256 hash.
keyword
Target.process.hash.sha512
SHA512 hash.
keyword
Target.process.name
Process name. Sometimes called program name or similar.
keyword
Target.process.parent.Ext
Object for all custom defined fields to live in.
object
Target.process.parent.Ext.architecture
Process architecture. It can differ from host architecture.
keyword
Target.process.parent.Ext.code_signature
Nested version of ECS code_signature fieldset.
nested
Target.process.parent.Ext.code_signature.exists
Boolean to capture if a signature is present.
boolean
Target.process.parent.Ext.code_signature.status
Additional information about the certificate status. This is useful for logging cryptographic errors with the certificate validity or trust status. Leave unpopulated if the validity or trust of the certificate was unchecked.
keyword
Target.process.parent.Ext.code_signature.subject_name
Subject name of the code signer
keyword
Target.process.parent.Ext.code_signature.trusted
Stores the trust status of the certificate chain. Validating the trust of the certificate chain may be complicated, and this field should only be populated by tools that actively check the status.
boolean
Target.process.parent.Ext.code_signature.valid
Boolean to capture if the digital signature is verified against the binary content. Leave unpopulated if a certificate was unchecked.
boolean
Target.process.parent.Ext.dll.Ext
Object for all custom defined fields to live in.
object
Target.process.parent.Ext.dll.Ext.code_signature
Nested version of ECS code_signature fieldset.
nested
Target.process.parent.Ext.dll.Ext.code_signature.exists
Boolean to capture if a signature is present.
boolean
Target.process.parent.Ext.dll.Ext.code_signature.status
Additional information about the certificate status. This is useful for logging cryptographic errors with the certificate validity or trust status. Leave unpopulated if the validity or trust of the certificate was unchecked.
keyword
Target.process.parent.Ext.dll.Ext.code_signature.subject_name
Subject name of the code signer
keyword
Target.process.parent.Ext.dll.Ext.code_signature.trusted
Stores the trust status of the certificate chain. Validating the trust of the certificate chain may be complicated, and this field should only be populated by tools that actively check the status.
boolean
Target.process.parent.Ext.dll.Ext.code_signature.valid
Boolean to capture if the digital signature is verified against the binary content. Leave unpopulated if a certificate was unchecked.
boolean
Target.process.parent.Ext.dll.Ext.compile_time
Timestamp from when the module was compiled.
date
Target.process.parent.Ext.dll.Ext.mapped_address
The base address where this module is loaded.
unsigned_long
Target.process.parent.Ext.dll.Ext.mapped_size
The size of this module's memory mapping, in bytes.
unsigned_long
Target.process.parent.Ext.dll.hash.md5
MD5 hash.
keyword
Target.process.parent.Ext.dll.hash.sha1
SHA1 hash.
keyword
Target.process.parent.Ext.dll.hash.sha256
SHA256 hash.
keyword
Target.process.parent.Ext.dll.hash.sha512
SHA512 hash.
keyword
Target.process.parent.Ext.dll.name
Name of the library. This generally maps to the name of the file on disk.
keyword
Target.process.parent.Ext.dll.path
Full file path of the library.
keyword
Target.process.parent.Ext.dll.pe.company
Internal company name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
Target.process.parent.Ext.dll.pe.description
Internal description of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
Target.process.parent.Ext.dll.pe.file_version
Internal version of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
Target.process.parent.Ext.dll.pe.imphash
A hash of the imports in a PE file. An imphash -- or import hash -- can be used to fingerprint binaries even after recompilation or other code-level transformations have occurred, which would change more traditional hash values. Learn more at https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/01/tracking-malware-import-hashing.html.
keyword
Target.process.parent.Ext.dll.pe.original_file_name
Internal name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
Target.process.parent.Ext.dll.pe.product
Internal product name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
Target.process.parent.Ext.protection
Indicates the protection level of this process. Uses the same syntax as Process Explorer. Examples include PsProtectedSignerWinTcb, PsProtectedSignerWinTcb-Light, and PsProtectedSignerWindows-Light.
keyword
Target.process.parent.Ext.real
The field set containing process info in case of any pid spoofing. This is mainly useful for process.parent.
object
Target.process.parent.Ext.real.pid
For process.parent this will be the ppid of the process that actually spawned the current process.
long
Target.process.parent.Ext.token.domain
Domain of token user.
keyword
Target.process.parent.Ext.token.elevation
Whether the token is elevated or not
boolean
Target.process.parent.Ext.token.elevation_type
What level of elevation the token has
keyword
Target.process.parent.Ext.token.impersonation_level
Impersonation level. Only valid for impersonation tokens.
keyword
Target.process.parent.Ext.token.integrity_level
Numeric integrity level.
long
Target.process.parent.Ext.token.integrity_level_name
Human readable integrity level.
keyword
Target.process.parent.Ext.token.is_appcontainer
Whether or not this is an appcontainer token.
boolean
Target.process.parent.Ext.token.privileges
Array describing the privileges associated with the token.
nested
Target.process.parent.Ext.token.privileges.description
Description of the privilege.
keyword
Target.process.parent.Ext.token.privileges.enabled
Whether or not the privilege is enabled.
boolean
Target.process.parent.Ext.token.privileges.name
Name of the privilege.
keyword
Target.process.parent.Ext.token.sid
Token user's Security Identifier (SID).
keyword
Target.process.parent.Ext.token.type
Type of the token, either primary or impersonation.
keyword
Target.process.parent.Ext.token.user
Username of token owner.
keyword
Target.process.parent.Ext.user
User associated with the running process.
keyword
Target.process.parent.args
Array of process arguments, starting with the absolute path to the executable. May be filtered to protect sensitive information.
keyword
Target.process.parent.args_count
Length of the process.args array. This field can be useful for querying or performing bucket analysis on how many arguments were provided to start a process. More arguments may be an indication of suspicious activity.
long
Target.process.parent.command_line
Full command line that started the process, including the absolute path to the executable, and all arguments. Some arguments may be filtered to protect sensitive information.
keyword
Target.process.parent.entity_id
Unique identifier for the process. The implementation of this is specified by the data source, but some examples of what could be used here are a process-generated UUID, Sysmon Process GUIDs, or a hash of some uniquely identifying components of a process. Constructing a globally unique identifier is a common practice to mitigate PID reuse as well as to identify a specific process over time, across multiple monitored hosts.
keyword
Target.process.parent.executable
Absolute path to the process executable.
keyword
Target.process.parent.exit_code
The exit code of the process, if this is a termination event. The field should be absent if there is no exit code for the event (e.g. process start).
long
Target.process.parent.hash.md5
MD5 hash.
keyword
Target.process.parent.hash.sha1
SHA1 hash.
keyword
Target.process.parent.hash.sha256
SHA256 hash.
keyword
Target.process.parent.hash.sha512
SHA512 hash.
keyword
Target.process.parent.name
Process name. Sometimes called program name or similar.
keyword
Target.process.parent.pe.company
Internal company name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
Target.process.parent.pe.description
Internal description of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
Target.process.parent.pe.file_version
Internal version of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
Target.process.parent.pe.imphash
A hash of the imports in a PE file. An imphash -- or import hash -- can be used to fingerprint binaries even after recompilation or other code-level transformations have occurred, which would change more traditional hash values. Learn more at https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/01/tracking-malware-import-hashing.html.
keyword
Target.process.parent.pe.original_file_name
Internal name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
Target.process.parent.pe.product
Internal product name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
Target.process.parent.pgid
Identifier of the group of processes the process belongs to.
long
Target.process.parent.pid
Process id.
long
Target.process.parent.ppid
Parent process' pid.
long
Target.process.parent.start
The time the process started.
date
Target.process.parent.thread.id
Thread ID.
long
Target.process.parent.thread.name
Thread name.
keyword
Target.process.parent.title
Process title. The proctitle, some times the same as process name. Can also be different: for example a browser setting its title to the web page currently opened.
keyword
Target.process.parent.uptime
Seconds the process has been up.
long
Target.process.parent.working_directory
The working directory of the process.
keyword
Target.process.pe.company
Internal company name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
Target.process.pe.description
Internal description of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
Target.process.pe.file_version
Internal version of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
Target.process.pe.imphash
A hash of the imports in a PE file. An imphash -- or import hash -- can be used to fingerprint binaries even after recompilation or other code-level transformations have occurred, which would change more traditional hash values. Learn more at https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/01/tracking-malware-import-hashing.html.
keyword
Target.process.pe.original_file_name
Internal name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
Target.process.pe.product
Internal product name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
Target.process.pgid
Identifier of the group of processes the process belongs to.
long
Target.process.pid
Process id.
long
Target.process.ppid
Parent process' pid.
long
Target.process.start
The time the process started.
date
Target.process.thread.Ext
Object for all custom defined fields to live in.
object
Target.process.thread.Ext.parameter
When a thread is created, this is the raw numerical value of its parameter.
unsigned_long
Target.process.thread.Ext.parameter_bytes_compressed
Up to 512KB of raw data from the thread parameter, if it is a valid pointer. This is compressed with zlib. To reduce data volume, this is de-duplicated on the endpoint, and may be missing from many alerts if the same data would be sent multiple times.
keyword
Target.process.thread.Ext.parameter_bytes_compressed_present
Whether parameter_bytes_compressed is present in this event.
boolean
Target.process.thread.Ext.service
Service associated with the thread.
keyword
Target.process.thread.Ext.start
The time the thread started.
date
Target.process.thread.Ext.start_address
Memory address where the thread began execution.
unsigned_long
Target.process.thread.Ext.start_address_allocation_offset
Offset of start_address into the memory allocation. Equal to start_address - start_address_details.allocation_base.
unsigned_long
Target.process.thread.Ext.start_address_bytes
A few (typically 32) raw opcode bytes at the thread start address, hex-encoded.
keyword
Target.process.thread.Ext.start_address_bytes_disasm
The bytes at the thread start address, disassembled into human-readable assembly code.
keyword
Target.process.thread.Ext.start_address_bytes_disasm_hash
The bytes at the thread start address, with immediate values capped to 0x100, disassembled into human-readable assembly code, then hashed.
keyword
Target.process.thread.Ext.start_address_module
The dll/module where the thread began execution.
keyword
Target.process.thread.Ext.token.domain
Domain of token user.
keyword
Target.process.thread.Ext.token.elevation
Whether the token is elevated or not
boolean
Target.process.thread.Ext.token.elevation_type
What level of elevation the token has
keyword
Target.process.thread.Ext.token.impersonation_level
Impersonation level. Only valid for impersonation tokens.
keyword
Target.process.thread.Ext.token.integrity_level
Numeric integrity level.
long
Target.process.thread.Ext.token.integrity_level_name
Human readable integrity level.
keyword
Target.process.thread.Ext.token.is_appcontainer
Whether or not this is an appcontainer token.
boolean
Target.process.thread.Ext.token.privileges
Array describing the privileges associated with the token.
nested
Target.process.thread.Ext.token.privileges.description
Description of the privilege.
keyword
Target.process.thread.Ext.token.privileges.enabled
Whether or not the privilege is enabled.
boolean
Target.process.thread.Ext.token.privileges.name
Name of the privilege.
keyword
Target.process.thread.Ext.token.sid
Token user's Security Identifier (SID).
keyword
Target.process.thread.Ext.token.type
Type of the token, either primary or impersonation.
keyword
Target.process.thread.Ext.token.user
Username of token owner.
keyword
Target.process.thread.Ext.uptime
Seconds since thread started.
long
Target.process.thread.id
Thread ID.
long
Target.process.thread.name
Thread name.
keyword
Target.process.title
Process title. The proctitle, some times the same as process name. Can also be different: for example a browser setting its title to the web page currently opened.
keyword
Target.process.uptime
Seconds the process has been up.
long
Target.process.working_directory
The working directory of the process.
keyword
agent.ephemeral_id
Ephemeral identifier of this agent (if one exists). This id normally changes across restarts, but agent.id does not.
keyword
agent.id
Unique identifier of this agent (if one exists). Example: For Beats this would be beat.id.
keyword
agent.name
Custom name of the agent. This is a name that can be given to an agent. This can be helpful if for example two Filebeat instances are running on the same host but a human readable separation is needed on which Filebeat instance data is coming from. If no name is given, the name is often left empty.
keyword
agent.type
Type of the agent. The agent type always stays the same and should be given by the agent used. In case of Filebeat the agent would always be Filebeat also if two Filebeat instances are run on the same machine.
keyword
agent.version
Version of the agent.
keyword
data_stream.dataset
Data stream dataset name.
constant_keyword
data_stream.namespace
Data stream namespace.
constant_keyword
data_stream.type
Data stream type.
constant_keyword
destination.geo.city_name
City name.
keyword
destination.geo.continent_code
Two-letter code representing continent's name.
keyword
destination.geo.continent_name
Name of the continent.
keyword
destination.geo.country_iso_code
Country ISO code.
keyword
destination.geo.country_name
Country name.
keyword
destination.geo.location
Longitude and latitude.
geo_point
destination.geo.name
User-defined description of a location, at the level of granularity they care about. Could be the name of their data centers, the floor number, if this describes a local physical entity, city names. Not typically used in automated geolocation.
keyword
destination.geo.postal_code
Postal code associated with the location. Values appropriate for this field may also be known as a postcode or ZIP code and will vary widely from country to country.
keyword
destination.geo.region_iso_code
Region ISO code.
keyword
destination.geo.region_name
Region name.
keyword
destination.geo.timezone
The time zone of the location, such as IANA time zone name.
keyword
destination.ip
IP address of the destination (IPv4 or IPv6).
ip
dll.Ext
Object for all custom defined fields to live in.
object
dll.Ext.code_signature
Nested version of ECS code_signature fieldset.
nested
dll.Ext.code_signature.exists
Boolean to capture if a signature is present.
boolean
dll.Ext.code_signature.status
Additional information about the certificate status. This is useful for logging cryptographic errors with the certificate validity or trust status. Leave unpopulated if the validity or trust of the certificate was unchecked.
keyword
dll.Ext.code_signature.subject_name
Subject name of the code signer
keyword
dll.Ext.code_signature.trusted
Stores the trust status of the certificate chain. Validating the trust of the certificate chain may be complicated, and this field should only be populated by tools that actively check the status.
boolean
dll.Ext.code_signature.valid
Boolean to capture if the digital signature is verified against the binary content. Leave unpopulated if a certificate was unchecked.
boolean
dll.Ext.compile_time
Timestamp from when the module was compiled.
date
dll.Ext.malware_classification.identifier
The model's unique identifier.
keyword
dll.Ext.malware_classification.score
The score produced by the classification model.
double
dll.Ext.malware_classification.threshold
The score threshold for the model. Files that score above this threshold are considered malicious.
double
dll.Ext.malware_classification.upx_packed
Whether UPX packing was detected.
boolean
dll.Ext.malware_classification.version
The version of the model used.
keyword
dll.Ext.mapped_address
The base address where this module is loaded.
unsigned_long
dll.Ext.mapped_size
The size of this module's memory mapping, in bytes.
unsigned_long
dll.code_signature.exists
Boolean to capture if a signature is present.
boolean
dll.code_signature.signing_id
The identifier used to sign the process. This is used to identify the application manufactured by a software vendor. The field is relevant to Apple *OS only.
keyword
dll.code_signature.status
Additional information about the certificate status. This is useful for logging cryptographic errors with the certificate validity or trust status. Leave unpopulated if the validity or trust of the certificate was unchecked.
keyword
dll.code_signature.subject_name
Subject name of the code signer
keyword
dll.code_signature.team_id
The team identifier used to sign the process. This is used to identify the team or vendor of a software product. The field is relevant to Apple *OS only.
keyword
dll.code_signature.trusted
Stores the trust status of the certificate chain. Validating the trust of the certificate chain may be complicated, and this field should only be populated by tools that actively check the status.
boolean
dll.code_signature.valid
Boolean to capture if the digital signature is verified against the binary content. Leave unpopulated if a certificate was unchecked.
boolean
dll.hash.md5
MD5 hash.
keyword
dll.hash.sha1
SHA1 hash.
keyword
dll.hash.sha256
SHA256 hash.
keyword
dll.hash.sha512
SHA512 hash.
keyword
dll.name
Name of the library. This generally maps to the name of the file on disk.
keyword
dll.path
Full file path of the library.
keyword
dll.pe.company
Internal company name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
dll.pe.description
Internal description of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
dll.pe.file_version
Internal version of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
dll.pe.imphash
A hash of the imports in a PE file. An imphash -- or import hash -- can be used to fingerprint binaries even after recompilation or other code-level transformations have occurred, which would change more traditional hash values. Learn more at https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/01/tracking-malware-import-hashing.html.
keyword
dll.pe.original_file_name
Internal name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
dll.pe.product
Internal product name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
dns.question.name
The name being queried. If the name field contains non-printable characters (below 32 or above 126), those characters should be represented as escaped base 10 integers (\DDD). Back slashes and quotes should be escaped. Tabs, carriage returns, and line feeds should be converted to \t, \r, and \n respectively.
keyword
dns.question.type
The type of record being queried.
keyword
ecs.version
ECS version this event conforms to. ecs.version is a required field and must exist in all events. When querying across multiple indices -- which may conform to slightly different ECS versions -- this field lets integrations adjust to the schema version of the events.
keyword
elastic.agent
The agent fields contain data about the Elastic Agent. The Elastic Agent is the management agent that manages other agents or process on the host.
object
elastic.agent.id
Unique identifier of this elastic agent (if one exists).
keyword
event.action
The action captured by the event. This describes the information in the event. It is more specific than event.category. Examples are group-add, process-started, file-created. The value is normally defined by the implementer.
keyword
event.category
This is one of four ECS Categorization Fields, and indicates the second level in the ECS category hierarchy. event.category represents the "big buckets" of ECS categories. For example, filtering on event.category:process yields all events relating to process activity. This field is closely related to event.type, which is used as a subcategory. This field is an array. This will allow proper categorization of some events that fall in multiple categories.
keyword
event.code
Identification code for this event, if one exists. Some event sources use event codes to identify messages unambiguously, regardless of message language or wording adjustments over time. An example of this is the Windows Event ID.
keyword
event.created
event.created contains the date/time when the event was first read by an agent, or by your pipeline. This field is distinct from @timestamp in that @timestamp typically contain the time extracted from the original event. In most situations, these two timestamps will be slightly different. The difference can be used to calculate the delay between your source generating an event, and the time when your agent first processed it. This can be used to monitor your agent's or pipeline's ability to keep up with your event source. In case the two timestamps are identical, @timestamp should be used.
date
event.dataset
Name of the dataset. If an event source publishes more than one type of log or events (e.g. access log, error log), the dataset is used to specify which one the event comes from. It's recommended but not required to start the dataset name with the module name, followed by a dot, then the dataset name.
keyword
event.hash
Hash (perhaps logstash fingerprint) of raw field to be able to demonstrate log integrity.
keyword
event.id
Unique ID to describe the event.
keyword
event.ingested
Timestamp when an event arrived in the central data store. This is different from @timestamp, which is when the event originally occurred. It's also different from event.created, which is meant to capture the first time an agent saw the event. In normal conditions, assuming no tampering, the timestamps should chronologically look like this: @timestamp < event.created < event.ingested.
date
event.kind
This is one of four ECS Categorization Fields, and indicates the highest level in the ECS category hierarchy. event.kind gives high-level information about what type of information the event contains, without being specific to the contents of the event. For example, values of this field distinguish alert events from metric events. The value of this field can be used to inform how these kinds of events should be handled. They may warrant different retention, different access control, it may also help understand whether the data coming in at a regular interval or not.
keyword
event.module
Name of the module this data is coming from. If your monitoring agent supports the concept of modules or plugins to process events of a given source (e.g. Apache logs), event.module should contain the name of this module.
keyword
event.outcome
This is one of four ECS Categorization Fields, and indicates the lowest level in the ECS category hierarchy. event.outcome simply denotes whether the event represents a success or a failure from the perspective of the entity that produced the event. Note that when a single transaction is described in multiple events, each event may populate different values of event.outcome, according to their perspective. Also note that in the case of a compound event (a single event that contains multiple logical events), this field should be populated with the value that best captures the overall success or failure from the perspective of the event producer. Further note that not all events will have an associated outcome. For example, this field is generally not populated for metric events, events with event.type:info, or any events for which an outcome does not make logical sense.
keyword
event.provider
Source of the event. Event transports such as Syslog or the Windows Event Log typically mention the source of an event. It can be the name of the software that generated the event (e.g. Sysmon, httpd), or of a subsystem of the operating system (kernel, Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing).
keyword
event.risk_score
Risk score or priority of the event (e.g. security solutions). Use your system's original value here.
float
event.sequence
Sequence number of the event. The sequence number is a value published by some event sources, to make the exact ordering of events unambiguous, regardless of the timestamp precision.
long
event.severity
The numeric severity of the event according to your event source. What the different severity values mean can be different between sources and use cases. It's up to the implementer to make sure severities are consistent across events from the same source. The Syslog severity belongs in log.syslog.severity.code. event.severity is meant to represent the severity according to the event source (e.g. firewall, IDS). If the event source does not publish its own severity, you may optionally copy the log.syslog.severity.code to event.severity.
long
event.type
This is one of four ECS Categorization Fields, and indicates the third level in the ECS category hierarchy. event.type represents a categorization "sub-bucket" that, when used along with the event.category field values, enables filtering events down to a level appropriate for single visualization. This field is an array. This will allow proper categorization of some events that fall in multiple event types.
keyword
file.Ext
Object for all custom defined fields to live in.
object
file.Ext.code_signature
Nested version of ECS code_signature fieldset.
nested
file.Ext.code_signature.exists
Boolean to capture if a signature is present.
boolean
file.Ext.code_signature.status
Additional information about the certificate status. This is useful for logging cryptographic errors with the certificate validity or trust status. Leave unpopulated if the validity or trust of the certificate was unchecked.
keyword
file.Ext.code_signature.subject_name
Subject name of the code signer
keyword
file.Ext.code_signature.trusted
Stores the trust status of the certificate chain. Validating the trust of the certificate chain may be complicated, and this field should only be populated by tools that actively check the status.
boolean
file.Ext.code_signature.valid
Boolean to capture if the digital signature is verified against the binary content. Leave unpopulated if a certificate was unchecked.
boolean
file.Ext.entry_modified
Time of last status change. See st_ctim member of struct stat.
double
file.Ext.macro.code_page
Identifies the character encoding used for this macro. https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/intl/code-page-identifiers
long
file.Ext.macro.collection
Object containing hashes for the macro collection.
object
file.Ext.macro.collection.hash.md5
MD5 hash.
keyword
file.Ext.macro.collection.hash.sha1
SHA1 hash.
keyword
file.Ext.macro.collection.hash.sha256
SHA256 hash.
keyword
file.Ext.macro.collection.hash.sha512
SHA512 hash.
keyword
file.Ext.macro.errors
Errors that occurred when parsing this document file.
nested
file.Ext.macro.errors.count
Number of times this error that occurred.
long
file.Ext.macro.errors.error_type
The type of parsing error that occurred.
keyword
file.Ext.macro.file_extension
The extension of the file containing this macro (e.g. .docm)
keyword
file.Ext.macro.project_file
Metadata about the corresponding VBA project file
object
file.Ext.macro.project_file.hash.md5
MD5 hash.
keyword
file.Ext.macro.project_file.hash.sha1
SHA1 hash.
keyword
file.Ext.macro.project_file.hash.sha256
SHA256 hash.
keyword
file.Ext.macro.project_file.hash.sha512
SHA512 hash.
keyword
file.Ext.macro.stream
Streams associated with the document.
nested
file.Ext.macro.stream.hash.md5
MD5 hash.
keyword
file.Ext.macro.stream.hash.sha1
SHA1 hash.
keyword
file.Ext.macro.stream.hash.sha256
SHA256 hash.
keyword
file.Ext.macro.stream.hash.sha512
SHA512 hash.
keyword
file.Ext.macro.stream.name
Name of the stream.
keyword
file.Ext.macro.stream.raw_code
First 100KB of raw stream binary. Can be useful to analyze false positives and malicious payloads.
keyword
file.Ext.macro.stream.raw_code_size
The original stream size. Indicates whether stream.raw_code was truncated.
keyword
file.Ext.malware_classification.identifier
The model's unique identifier.
keyword
file.Ext.malware_classification.score
The score produced by the classification model.
double
file.Ext.malware_classification.threshold
The score threshold for the model. Files that score above this threshold are considered malicious.
double
file.Ext.malware_classification.upx_packed
Whether UPX packing was detected.
boolean
file.Ext.malware_classification.version
The version of the model used.
keyword
file.Ext.original
Original file information during a modification event.
object
file.Ext.original.gid
Primary group ID (GID) of the file.
keyword
file.Ext.original.group
Primary group name of the file.
keyword
file.Ext.original.mode
Original file mode prior to a modification event
keyword
file.Ext.original.name
Original file name prior to a modification event
keyword
file.Ext.original.owner
File owner's username.
keyword
file.Ext.original.path
Original file path prior to a modification event
keyword
file.Ext.original.uid
The user ID (UID) or security identifier (SID) of the file owner.
keyword
file.Ext.quarantine_message
Message describing quarantine results.
keyword
file.Ext.quarantine_path
Path on endpoint the quarantined file was originally.
keyword
file.Ext.quarantine_result
Boolean representing whether or not file quarantine succeeded.
boolean
file.Ext.temp_file_path
Path on endpoint where a copy of the file is being stored. Used to make ephemeral files retrievable.
keyword
file.Ext.windows
Platform-specific Windows fields
object
file.Ext.windows.zone_identifier
Windows zone identifier for a file
keyword
file.accessed
Last time the file was accessed. Note that not all filesystems keep track of access time.
date
file.attributes
Array of file attributes. Attributes names will vary by platform. Here's a non-exhaustive list of values that are expected in this field: archive, compressed, directory, encrypted, execute, hidden, read, readonly, system, write.
keyword
file.code_signature.exists
Boolean to capture if a signature is present.
boolean
file.code_signature.signing_id
The identifier used to sign the process. This is used to identify the application manufactured by a software vendor. The field is relevant to Apple *OS only.
keyword
file.code_signature.status
Additional information about the certificate status. This is useful for logging cryptographic errors with the certificate validity or trust status. Leave unpopulated if the validity or trust of the certificate was unchecked.
keyword
file.code_signature.subject_name
Subject name of the code signer
keyword
file.code_signature.team_id
The team identifier used to sign the process. This is used to identify the team or vendor of a software product. The field is relevant to Apple *OS only.
keyword
file.code_signature.trusted
Stores the trust status of the certificate chain. Validating the trust of the certificate chain may be complicated, and this field should only be populated by tools that actively check the status.
boolean
file.code_signature.valid
Boolean to capture if the digital signature is verified against the binary content. Leave unpopulated if a certificate was unchecked.
boolean
file.created
File creation time. Note that not all filesystems store the creation time.
date
file.ctime
Last time the file attributes or metadata changed. Note that changes to the file content will update mtime. This implies ctime will be adjusted at the same time, since mtime is an attribute of the file.
date
file.device
Device that is the source of the file.
keyword
file.directory
Directory where the file is located. It should include the drive letter, when appropriate.
keyword
file.drive_letter
Drive letter where the file is located. This field is only relevant on Windows. The value should be uppercase, and not include the colon.
keyword
file.extension
File extension, excluding the leading dot. Note that when the file name has multiple extensions (example.tar.gz), only the last one should be captured ("gz", not "tar.gz").
keyword
file.gid
Primary group ID (GID) of the file.
keyword
file.group
Primary group name of the file.
keyword
file.hash.md5
MD5 hash.
keyword
file.hash.sha1
SHA1 hash.
keyword
file.hash.sha256
SHA256 hash.
keyword
file.hash.sha512
SHA512 hash.
keyword
file.inode
Inode representing the file in the filesystem.
keyword
file.mime_type
MIME type should identify the format of the file or stream of bytes using https://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types/media-types.xhtml[IANA official types], where possible. When more than one type is applicable, the most specific type should be used.
keyword
file.mode
Mode of the file in octal representation.
keyword
file.mtime
Last time the file content was modified.
date
file.name
Name of the file including the extension, without the directory.
keyword
file.owner
File owner's username.
keyword
file.path
Full path to the file, including the file name. It should include the drive letter, when appropriate.
keyword
file.pe.company
Internal company name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
file.pe.description
Internal description of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
file.pe.file_version
Internal version of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
file.pe.imphash
A hash of the imports in a PE file. An imphash -- or import hash -- can be used to fingerprint binaries even after recompilation or other code-level transformations have occurred, which would change more traditional hash values. Learn more at https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/01/tracking-malware-import-hashing.html.
keyword
file.pe.original_file_name
Internal name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
file.pe.product
Internal product name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
file.size
File size in bytes. Only relevant when file.type is "file".
long
file.target_path
Target path for symlinks.
keyword
file.type
File type (file, dir, or symlink).
keyword
file.uid
The user ID (UID) or security identifier (SID) of the file owner.
keyword
group.Ext
Object for all custom defined fields to live in.
object
group.Ext.real
Group info prior to any setgid operations.
object
group.Ext.real.id
Unique identifier for the group on the system/platform.
keyword
group.Ext.real.name
Name of the group.
keyword
group.domain
Name of the directory the group is a member of. For example, an LDAP or Active Directory domain name.
keyword
group.id
Unique identifier for the group on the system/platform.
keyword
group.name
Name of the group.
keyword
host.architecture
Operating system architecture.
keyword
host.domain
Name of the domain of which the host is a member. For example, on Windows this could be the host's Active Directory domain or NetBIOS domain name. For Linux this could be the domain of the host's LDAP provider.
keyword
host.geo.city_name
City name.
keyword
host.geo.continent_code
Two-letter code representing continent's name.
keyword
host.geo.continent_name
Name of the continent.
keyword
host.geo.country_iso_code
Country ISO code.
keyword
host.geo.country_name
Country name.
keyword
host.geo.location
Longitude and latitude.
geo_point
host.geo.name
User-defined description of a location, at the level of granularity they care about. Could be the name of their data centers, the floor number, if this describes a local physical entity, city names. Not typically used in automated geolocation.
keyword
host.geo.postal_code
Postal code associated with the location. Values appropriate for this field may also be known as a postcode or ZIP code and will vary widely from country to country.
keyword
host.geo.region_iso_code
Region ISO code.
keyword
host.geo.region_name
Region name.
keyword
host.geo.timezone
The time zone of the location, such as IANA time zone name.
keyword
host.hostname
Hostname of the host. It normally contains what the hostname command returns on the host machine.
keyword
host.id
Unique host id. As hostname is not always unique, use values that are meaningful in your environment. Example: The current usage of beat.name.
keyword
host.ip
Host ip addresses.
ip
host.mac
Host MAC addresses. The notation format from RFC 7042 is suggested: Each octet (that is, 8-bit byte) is represented by two [uppercase] hexadecimal digits giving the value of the octet as an unsigned integer. Successive octets are separated by a hyphen.
keyword
host.name
Name of the host. It can contain what hostname returns on Unix systems, the fully qualified domain name, or a name specified by the user. The sender decides which value to use.
keyword
host.os.Ext
Object for all custom defined fields to live in.
object
host.os.Ext.variant
A string value or phrase that further aid to classify or qualify the operating system (OS). For example the distribution for a Linux OS will be entered in this field.
keyword
host.os.family
OS family (such as redhat, debian, freebsd, windows).
keyword
host.os.full
Operating system name, including the version or code name.
keyword
host.os.kernel
Operating system kernel version as a raw string.
keyword
host.os.name
Operating system name, without the version.
keyword
host.os.platform
Operating system platform (such centos, ubuntu, windows).
keyword
host.os.version
Operating system version as a raw string.
keyword
host.type
Type of host. For Cloud providers this can be the machine type like t2.medium. If vm, this could be the container, for example, or other information meaningful in your environment.
keyword
host.uptime
Seconds the host has been up.
long
host.user.Ext
Object for all custom defined fields to live in.
object
host.user.Ext.real
User info prior to any setuid operations.
object
host.user.Ext.real.id
One or multiple unique identifiers of the user.
keyword
host.user.Ext.real.name
Short name or login of the user.
keyword
host.user.domain
Name of the directory the user is a member of. For example, an LDAP or Active Directory domain name.
keyword
host.user.email
User email address.
keyword
host.user.full_name
User's full name, if available.
keyword
host.user.group.Ext
Object for all custom defined fields to live in.
object
host.user.group.Ext.real
Group info prior to any setgid operations.
object
host.user.group.Ext.real.id
Unique identifier for the group on the system/platform.
keyword
host.user.group.Ext.real.name
Name of the group.
keyword
host.user.group.domain
Name of the directory the group is a member of. For example, an LDAP or Active Directory domain name.
keyword
host.user.group.id
Unique identifier for the group on the system/platform.
keyword
host.user.group.name
Name of the group.
keyword
host.user.hash
Unique user hash to correlate information for a user in anonymized form. Useful if user.id or user.name contain confidential information and cannot be used.
keyword
host.user.id
Unique identifier of the user.
keyword
host.user.name
Short name or login of the user.
keyword
message
For log events the message field contains the log message, optimized for viewing in a log viewer. For structured logs without an original message field, other fields can be concatenated to form a human-readable summary of the event. If multiple messages exist, they can be combined into one message.
text
process.Ext
Object for all custom defined fields to live in.
object
process.Ext.ancestry
An array of entity_ids indicating the ancestors for this event
keyword
process.Ext.architecture
Process architecture. It can differ from host architecture.
keyword
process.Ext.authentication_id
Process authentication ID
keyword
process.Ext.code_signature
Nested version of ECS code_signature fieldset.
nested
process.Ext.code_signature.exists
Boolean to capture if a signature is present.
boolean
process.Ext.code_signature.status
Additional information about the certificate status. This is useful for logging cryptographic errors with the certificate validity or trust status. Leave unpopulated if the validity or trust of the certificate was unchecked.
keyword
process.Ext.code_signature.subject_name
Subject name of the code signer
keyword
process.Ext.code_signature.trusted
Stores the trust status of the certificate chain. Validating the trust of the certificate chain may be complicated, and this field should only be populated by tools that actively check the status.
boolean
process.Ext.code_signature.valid
Boolean to capture if the digital signature is verified against the binary content. Leave unpopulated if a certificate was unchecked.
boolean
process.Ext.dll.Ext
Object for all custom defined fields to live in.
object
process.Ext.dll.Ext.code_signature
Nested version of ECS code_signature fieldset.
nested
process.Ext.dll.Ext.code_signature.exists
Boolean to capture if a signature is present.
boolean
process.Ext.dll.Ext.code_signature.status
Additional information about the certificate status. This is useful for logging cryptographic errors with the certificate validity or trust status. Leave unpopulated if the validity or trust of the certificate was unchecked.
keyword
process.Ext.dll.Ext.code_signature.subject_name
Subject name of the code signer
keyword
process.Ext.dll.Ext.code_signature.trusted
Stores the trust status of the certificate chain. Validating the trust of the certificate chain may be complicated, and this field should only be populated by tools that actively check the status.
boolean
process.Ext.dll.Ext.code_signature.valid
Boolean to capture if the digital signature is verified against the binary content. Leave unpopulated if a certificate was unchecked.
boolean
process.Ext.dll.Ext.compile_time
Timestamp from when the module was compiled.
date
process.Ext.dll.Ext.mapped_address
The base address where this module is loaded.
unsigned_long
process.Ext.dll.Ext.mapped_size
The size of this module's memory mapping, in bytes.
unsigned_long
process.Ext.dll.hash.md5
MD5 hash.
keyword
process.Ext.dll.hash.sha1
SHA1 hash.
keyword
process.Ext.dll.hash.sha256
SHA256 hash.
keyword
process.Ext.dll.hash.sha512
SHA512 hash.
keyword
process.Ext.dll.name
Name of the library. This generally maps to the name of the file on disk.
keyword
process.Ext.dll.path
Full file path of the library.
keyword
process.Ext.dll.pe.company
Internal company name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
process.Ext.dll.pe.description
Internal description of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
process.Ext.dll.pe.file_version
Internal version of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
process.Ext.dll.pe.imphash
A hash of the imports in a PE file. An imphash -- or import hash -- can be used to fingerprint binaries even after recompilation or other code-level transformations have occurred, which would change more traditional hash values. Learn more at https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/01/tracking-malware-import-hashing.html.
keyword
process.Ext.dll.pe.original_file_name
Internal name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
process.Ext.dll.pe.product
Internal product name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
process.Ext.malware_classification.identifier
The model's unique identifier.
keyword
process.Ext.malware_classification.score
The score produced by the classification model.
double
process.Ext.malware_classification.threshold
The score threshold for the model. Files that score above this threshold are considered malicious.
double
process.Ext.malware_classification.upx_packed
Whether UPX packing was detected.
boolean
process.Ext.malware_classification.version
The version of the model used.
keyword
process.Ext.memory_region.allocation_base
Base address of the memory allocation containing the memory region.
unsigned_long
process.Ext.memory_region.allocation_protection
Original memory protection requested when the memory was allocated. Example values include "RWX" and "R-X".
keyword
process.Ext.memory_region.allocation_size
Original memory size requested when the memory was allocated.
unsigned_long
process.Ext.memory_region.allocation_type
The memory allocation type. Example values include "IMAGE", "MAPPED", and "PRIVATE".
keyword
process.Ext.memory_region.bytes_address
The address where bytes_compressed begins.
unsigned_long
process.Ext.memory_region.bytes_allocation_offset
Offset of bytes_address the memory allocation. Equal to bytes_address - allocation_base.
unsigned_long
process.Ext.memory_region.bytes_compressed
Up to 4MB of raw data from the memory allocation. This is compressed with zlib.To reduce data volume, this is de-duplicated on the endpoint, and may be missing from many alerts if the same data would be sent multiple times.
keyword
process.Ext.memory_region.bytes_compressed_present
Whether bytes_compressed is present in this event.
boolean
process.Ext.memory_region.malware_signature.all_names
A sequence of signature names matched.
keyword
process.Ext.memory_region.malware_signature.primary
The first matching details.
object
process.Ext.memory_region.malware_signature.primary.signature.id
The id of the first yara rule matched.
keyword
process.Ext.memory_region.malware_signature.primary.signature.name
The name of the first yara rule matched.
keyword
process.Ext.memory_region.mapped_pe.company
Internal company name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
process.Ext.memory_region.mapped_pe.description
Internal description of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
process.Ext.memory_region.mapped_pe.file_version
Internal version of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
process.Ext.memory_region.mapped_pe.imphash
A hash of the imports in a PE file. An imphash -- or import hash -- can be used to fingerprint binaries even after recompilation or other code-level transformations have occurred, which would change more traditional hash values. Learn more at https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/01/tracking-malware-import-hashing.html.
keyword
process.Ext.memory_region.mapped_pe.original_file_name
Internal name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
process.Ext.memory_region.mapped_pe.product
Internal product name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
process.Ext.memory_region.mapped_pe_detected
Whether the file at mapped_path is an executable.
boolean
process.Ext.memory_region.memory_pe.company
Internal company name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
process.Ext.memory_region.memory_pe.description
Internal description of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
process.Ext.memory_region.memory_pe.file_version
Internal version of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
process.Ext.memory_region.memory_pe.imphash
A hash of the imports in a PE file. An imphash -- or import hash -- can be used to fingerprint binaries even after recompilation or other code-level transformations have occurred, which would change more traditional hash values. Learn more at https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/01/tracking-malware-import-hashing.html.
keyword
process.Ext.memory_region.memory_pe.original_file_name
Internal name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
process.Ext.memory_region.memory_pe.product
Internal product name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
process.Ext.memory_region.memory_pe_detected
Whether an executable file was found in memory.
boolean
process.Ext.memory_region.region_base
Base address of the memory region.
unsigned_long
process.Ext.memory_region.region_protection
Memory protection of the memory region. Example values include "RWX" and "R-X".
keyword
process.Ext.memory_region.region_size
Size of the memory region.
unsigned_long
process.Ext.memory_region.region_state
State of the memory region. Example values include "RESERVE", "COMMIT", and "FREE".
keyword
process.Ext.memory_region.strings
Array of strings found within the memory region.
keyword
process.Ext.protection
Indicates the protection level of this process. Uses the same syntax as Process Explorer. Examples include PsProtectedSignerWinTcb, PsProtectedSignerWinTcb-Light, and PsProtectedSignerWindows-Light.
keyword
process.Ext.services
Services running in this process.
keyword
process.Ext.session
Session information for the current process
keyword
process.Ext.token.domain
Domain of token user.
keyword
process.Ext.token.elevation
Whether the token is elevated or not
boolean
process.Ext.token.elevation_type
What level of elevation the token has
keyword
process.Ext.token.impersonation_level
Impersonation level. Only valid for impersonation tokens.
keyword
process.Ext.token.integrity_level
Numeric integrity level.
long
process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name
Human readable integrity level.
keyword
process.Ext.token.is_appcontainer
Whether or not this is an appcontainer token.
boolean
process.Ext.token.privileges
Array describing the privileges associated with the token.
nested
process.Ext.token.privileges.description
Description of the privilege.
keyword
process.Ext.token.privileges.enabled
Whether or not the privilege is enabled.
boolean
process.Ext.token.privileges.name
Name of the privilege.
keyword
process.Ext.token.sid
Token user's Security Identifier (SID).
keyword
process.Ext.token.type
Type of the token, either primary or impersonation.
keyword
process.Ext.token.user
Username of token owner.
keyword
process.Ext.user
User associated with the running process.
keyword
process.args
Array of process arguments, starting with the absolute path to the executable. May be filtered to protect sensitive information.
keyword
process.args_count
Length of the process.args array. This field can be useful for querying or performing bucket analysis on how many arguments were provided to start a process. More arguments may be an indication of suspicious activity.
long
process.code_signature.exists
Boolean to capture if a signature is present.
boolean
process.code_signature.signing_id
The identifier used to sign the process. This is used to identify the application manufactured by a software vendor. The field is relevant to Apple *OS only.
keyword
process.code_signature.status
Additional information about the certificate status. This is useful for logging cryptographic errors with the certificate validity or trust status. Leave unpopulated if the validity or trust of the certificate was unchecked.
keyword
process.code_signature.subject_name
Subject name of the code signer
keyword
process.code_signature.team_id
The team identifier used to sign the process. This is used to identify the team or vendor of a software product. The field is relevant to Apple *OS only.
keyword
process.code_signature.trusted
Stores the trust status of the certificate chain. Validating the trust of the certificate chain may be complicated, and this field should only be populated by tools that actively check the status.
boolean
process.code_signature.valid
Boolean to capture if the digital signature is verified against the binary content. Leave unpopulated if a certificate was unchecked.
boolean
process.command_line
Full command line that started the process, including the absolute path to the executable, and all arguments. Some arguments may be filtered to protect sensitive information.
keyword
process.entity_id
Unique identifier for the process. The implementation of this is specified by the data source, but some examples of what could be used here are a process-generated UUID, Sysmon Process GUIDs, or a hash of some uniquely identifying components of a process. Constructing a globally unique identifier is a common practice to mitigate PID reuse as well as to identify a specific process over time, across multiple monitored hosts.
keyword
process.executable
Absolute path to the process executable.
keyword
process.exit_code
The exit code of the process, if this is a termination event. The field should be absent if there is no exit code for the event (e.g. process start).
long
process.hash.md5
MD5 hash.
keyword
process.hash.sha1
SHA1 hash.
keyword
process.hash.sha256
SHA256 hash.
keyword
process.hash.sha512
SHA512 hash.
keyword
process.name
Process name. Sometimes called program name or similar.
keyword
process.parent.Ext
Object for all custom defined fields to live in.
object
process.parent.Ext.architecture
Process architecture. It can differ from host architecture.
keyword
process.parent.Ext.code_signature
Nested version of ECS code_signature fieldset.
nested
process.parent.Ext.code_signature.exists
Boolean to capture if a signature is present.
boolean
process.parent.Ext.code_signature.status
Additional information about the certificate status. This is useful for logging cryptographic errors with the certificate validity or trust status. Leave unpopulated if the validity or trust of the certificate was unchecked.
keyword
process.parent.Ext.code_signature.subject_name
Subject name of the code signer
keyword
process.parent.Ext.code_signature.trusted
Stores the trust status of the certificate chain. Validating the trust of the certificate chain may be complicated, and this field should only be populated by tools that actively check the status.
boolean
process.parent.Ext.code_signature.valid
Boolean to capture if the digital signature is verified against the binary content. Leave unpopulated if a certificate was unchecked.
boolean
process.parent.Ext.dll.Ext
Object for all custom defined fields to live in.
object
process.parent.Ext.dll.Ext.code_signature
Nested version of ECS code_signature fieldset.
nested
process.parent.Ext.dll.Ext.code_signature.exists
Boolean to capture if a signature is present.
boolean
process.parent.Ext.dll.Ext.code_signature.status
Additional information about the certificate status. This is useful for logging cryptographic errors with the certificate validity or trust status. Leave unpopulated if the validity or trust of the certificate was unchecked.
keyword
process.parent.Ext.dll.Ext.code_signature.subject_name
Subject name of the code signer
keyword
process.parent.Ext.dll.Ext.code_signature.trusted
Stores the trust status of the certificate chain. Validating the trust of the certificate chain may be complicated, and this field should only be populated by tools that actively check the status.
boolean
process.parent.Ext.dll.Ext.code_signature.valid
Boolean to capture if the digital signature is verified against the binary content. Leave unpopulated if a certificate was unchecked.
boolean
process.parent.Ext.dll.Ext.compile_time
Timestamp from when the module was compiled.
date
process.parent.Ext.dll.Ext.mapped_address
The base address where this module is loaded.
unsigned_long
process.parent.Ext.dll.Ext.mapped_size
The size of this module's memory mapping, in bytes.
unsigned_long
process.parent.Ext.dll.hash.md5
MD5 hash.
keyword
process.parent.Ext.dll.hash.sha1
SHA1 hash.
keyword
process.parent.Ext.dll.hash.sha256
SHA256 hash.
keyword
process.parent.Ext.dll.hash.sha512
SHA512 hash.
keyword
process.parent.Ext.dll.name
Name of the library. This generally maps to the name of the file on disk.
keyword
process.parent.Ext.dll.path
Full file path of the library.
keyword
process.parent.Ext.dll.pe.company
Internal company name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
process.parent.Ext.dll.pe.description
Internal description of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
process.parent.Ext.dll.pe.file_version
Internal version of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
process.parent.Ext.dll.pe.imphash
A hash of the imports in a PE file. An imphash -- or import hash -- can be used to fingerprint binaries even after recompilation or other code-level transformations have occurred, which would change more traditional hash values. Learn more at https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/01/tracking-malware-import-hashing.html.
keyword
process.parent.Ext.dll.pe.original_file_name
Internal name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
process.parent.Ext.dll.pe.product
Internal product name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
process.parent.Ext.protection
Indicates the protection level of this process. Uses the same syntax as Process Explorer. Examples include PsProtectedSignerWinTcb, PsProtectedSignerWinTcb-Light, and PsProtectedSignerWindows-Light.
keyword
process.parent.Ext.real
The field set containing process info in case of any pid spoofing. This is mainly useful for process.parent.
object
process.parent.Ext.real.pid
For process.parent this will be the ppid of the process that actually spawned the current process.
long
process.parent.Ext.token.domain
Domain of token user.
keyword
process.parent.Ext.token.elevation
Whether the token is elevated or not
boolean
process.parent.Ext.token.elevation_type
What level of elevation the token has
keyword
process.parent.Ext.token.impersonation_level
Impersonation level. Only valid for impersonation tokens.
keyword
process.parent.Ext.token.integrity_level
Numeric integrity level.
long
process.parent.Ext.token.integrity_level_name
Human readable integrity level.
keyword
process.parent.Ext.token.is_appcontainer
Whether or not this is an appcontainer token.
boolean
process.parent.Ext.token.privileges
Array describing the privileges associated with the token.
nested
process.parent.Ext.token.privileges.description
Description of the privilege.
keyword
process.parent.Ext.token.privileges.enabled
Whether or not the privilege is enabled.
boolean
process.parent.Ext.token.privileges.name
Name of the privilege.
keyword
process.parent.Ext.token.sid
Token user's Security Identifier (SID).
keyword
process.parent.Ext.token.type
Type of the token, either primary or impersonation.
keyword
process.parent.Ext.token.user
Username of token owner.
keyword
process.parent.Ext.user
User associated with the running process.
keyword
process.parent.args
Array of process arguments, starting with the absolute path to the executable. May be filtered to protect sensitive information.
keyword
process.parent.args_count
Length of the process.args array. This field can be useful for querying or performing bucket analysis on how many arguments were provided to start a process. More arguments may be an indication of suspicious activity.
long
process.parent.command_line
Full command line that started the process, including the absolute path to the executable, and all arguments. Some arguments may be filtered to protect sensitive information.
keyword
process.parent.entity_id
Unique identifier for the process. The implementation of this is specified by the data source, but some examples of what could be used here are a process-generated UUID, Sysmon Process GUIDs, or a hash of some uniquely identifying components of a process. Constructing a globally unique identifier is a common practice to mitigate PID reuse as well as to identify a specific process over time, across multiple monitored hosts.
keyword
process.parent.executable
Absolute path to the process executable.
keyword
process.parent.exit_code
The exit code of the process, if this is a termination event. The field should be absent if there is no exit code for the event (e.g. process start).
long
process.parent.hash.md5
MD5 hash.
keyword
process.parent.hash.sha1
SHA1 hash.
keyword
process.parent.hash.sha256
SHA256 hash.
keyword
process.parent.hash.sha512
SHA512 hash.
keyword
process.parent.name
Process name. Sometimes called program name or similar.
keyword
process.parent.pe.company
Internal company name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
process.parent.pe.description
Internal description of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
process.parent.pe.file_version
Internal version of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
process.parent.pe.imphash
A hash of the imports in a PE file. An imphash -- or import hash -- can be used to fingerprint binaries even after recompilation or other code-level transformations have occurred, which would change more traditional hash values. Learn more at https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/01/tracking-malware-import-hashing.html.
keyword
process.parent.pe.original_file_name
Internal name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
process.parent.pe.product
Internal product name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
process.parent.pgid
Identifier of the group of processes the process belongs to.
long
process.parent.pid
Process id.
long
process.parent.ppid
Parent process' pid.
long
process.parent.start
The time the process started.
date
process.parent.thread.id
Thread ID.
long
process.parent.thread.name
Thread name.
keyword
process.parent.title
Process title. The proctitle, some times the same as process name. Can also be different: for example a browser setting its title to the web page currently opened.
keyword
process.parent.uptime
Seconds the process has been up.
long
process.parent.working_directory
The working directory of the process.
keyword
process.pe.company
Internal company name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
process.pe.description
Internal description of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
process.pe.file_version
Internal version of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
process.pe.imphash
A hash of the imports in a PE file. An imphash -- or import hash -- can be used to fingerprint binaries even after recompilation or other code-level transformations have occurred, which would change more traditional hash values. Learn more at https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/01/tracking-malware-import-hashing.html.
keyword
process.pe.original_file_name
Internal name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
process.pe.product
Internal product name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
process.pgid
Identifier of the group of processes the process belongs to.
long
process.pid
Process id.
long
process.ppid
Parent process' pid.
long
process.start
The time the process started.
date
process.thread.Ext
Object for all custom defined fields to live in.
object
process.thread.Ext.parameter
When a thread is created, this is the raw numerical value of its parameter.
unsigned_long
process.thread.Ext.parameter_bytes_compressed
Up to 512KB of raw data from the thread parameter, if it is a valid pointer. This is compressed with zlib. To reduce data volume, this is de-duplicated on the endpoint, and may be missing from many alerts if the same data would be sent multiple times.
keyword
process.thread.Ext.parameter_bytes_compressed_present
Whether parameter_bytes_compressed is present in this event.
boolean
process.thread.Ext.service
Service associated with the thread.
keyword
process.thread.Ext.start
The time the thread started.
date
process.thread.Ext.start_address
Memory address where the thread began execution.
unsigned_long
process.thread.Ext.start_address_allocation_offset
Offset of start_address into the memory allocation. Equal to start_address - start_address_details.allocation_base.
unsigned_long
process.thread.Ext.start_address_bytes
A few (typically 32) raw opcode bytes at the thread start address, hex-encoded.
keyword
process.thread.Ext.start_address_bytes_disasm
The bytes at the thread start address, disassembled into human-readable assembly code.
keyword
process.thread.Ext.start_address_bytes_disasm_hash
The bytes at the thread start address, with immediate values capped to 0x100, disassembled into human-readable assembly code, then hashed.
keyword
process.thread.Ext.start_address_module
The dll/module where the thread began execution.
keyword
process.thread.Ext.token.domain
Domain of token user.
keyword
process.thread.Ext.token.elevation
Whether the token is elevated or not
boolean
process.thread.Ext.token.elevation_type
What level of elevation the token has
keyword
process.thread.Ext.token.impersonation_level
Impersonation level. Only valid for impersonation tokens.
keyword
process.thread.Ext.token.integrity_level
Numeric integrity level.
long
process.thread.Ext.token.integrity_level_name
Human readable integrity level.
keyword
process.thread.Ext.token.is_appcontainer
Whether or not this is an appcontainer token.
boolean
process.thread.Ext.token.privileges
Array describing the privileges associated with the token.
nested
process.thread.Ext.token.privileges.description
Description of the privilege.
keyword
process.thread.Ext.token.privileges.enabled
Whether or not the privilege is enabled.
boolean
process.thread.Ext.token.privileges.name
Name of the privilege.
keyword
process.thread.Ext.token.sid
Token user's Security Identifier (SID).
keyword
process.thread.Ext.token.type
Type of the token, either primary or impersonation.
keyword
process.thread.Ext.token.user
Username of token owner.
keyword
process.thread.Ext.uptime
Seconds since thread started.
long
process.thread.id
Thread ID.
long
process.thread.name
Thread name.
keyword
process.title
Process title. The proctitle, some times the same as process name. Can also be different: for example a browser setting its title to the web page currently opened.
keyword
process.uptime
Seconds the process has been up.
long
process.working_directory
The working directory of the process.
keyword
registry.data.strings
Content when writing string types. Populated as an array when writing string data to the registry. For single string registry types (REG_SZ, REG_EXPAND_SZ), this should be an array with one string. For sequences of string with REG_MULTI_SZ, this array will be variable length. For numeric data, such as REG_DWORD and REG_QWORD, this should be populated with the decimal representation (e.g "1").
keyword
registry.path
Full path, including hive, key and value
keyword
registry.value
Name of the value written.
keyword
rule.author
Name, organization, or pseudonym of the author or authors who created the rule used to generate this event.
keyword
rule.category
A categorization value keyword used by the entity using the rule for detection of this event.
keyword
rule.description
The description of the rule generating the event.
keyword
rule.id
A rule ID that is unique within the scope of an agent, observer, or other entity using the rule for detection of this event.
keyword
rule.license
Name of the license under which the rule used to generate this event is made available.
keyword
rule.name
The name of the rule or signature generating the event.
keyword
rule.reference
Reference URL to additional information about the rule used to generate this event. The URL can point to the vendor's documentation about the rule. If that's not available, it can also be a link to a more general page describing this type of alert.
keyword
rule.ruleset
Name of the ruleset, policy, group, or parent category in which the rule used to generate this event is a member.
keyword
rule.uuid
A rule ID that is unique within the scope of a set or group of agents, observers, or other entities using the rule for detection of this event.
keyword
rule.version
The version / revision of the rule being used for analysis.
keyword
source.geo.city_name
City name.
keyword
source.geo.continent_code
Two-letter code representing continent's name.
keyword
source.geo.continent_name
Name of the continent.
keyword
source.geo.country_iso_code
Country ISO code.
keyword
source.geo.country_name
Country name.
keyword
source.geo.location
Longitude and latitude.
geo_point
source.geo.name
User-defined description of a location, at the level of granularity they care about. Could be the name of their data centers, the floor number, if this describes a local physical entity, city names. Not typically used in automated geolocation.
keyword
source.geo.postal_code
Postal code associated with the location. Values appropriate for this field may also be known as a postcode or ZIP code and will vary widely from country to country.
keyword
source.geo.region_iso_code
Region ISO code.
keyword
source.geo.region_name
Region name.
keyword
source.geo.timezone
The time zone of the location, such as IANA time zone name.
keyword
source.ip
IP address of the source (IPv4 or IPv6).
ip
threat.enrichments
A list of associated indicators objects enriching the event, and the context of that association/enrichment.
nested
threat.enrichments.indicator
Object containing associated indicators enriching the event.
object
threat.enrichments.indicator.as.number
Unique number allocated to the autonomous system. The autonomous system number (ASN) uniquely identifies each network on the Internet.
long
threat.enrichments.indicator.as.organization.name
Organization name.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.confidence
Identifies the confidence rating assigned by the provider using STIX confidence scales. Expected values: * Not Specified, None, Low, Medium, High * 0-10 * Admirality Scale (1-6) * DNI Scale (5-95) * WEP Scale (Impossible - Certain)
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.description
Describes the type of action conducted by the threat.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.email.address
Identifies a threat indicator as an email address (irrespective of direction).
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.Ext
Object for all custom defined fields to live in.
object
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.Ext.code_signature
Nested version of ECS code_signature fieldset.
nested
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.Ext.code_signature.exists
Boolean to capture if a signature is present.
boolean
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.Ext.code_signature.status
Additional information about the certificate status. This is useful for logging cryptographic errors with the certificate validity or trust status. Leave unpopulated if the validity or trust of the certificate was unchecked.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.Ext.code_signature.subject_name
Subject name of the code signer
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.Ext.code_signature.trusted
Stores the trust status of the certificate chain. Validating the trust of the certificate chain may be complicated, and this field should only be populated by tools that actively check the status.
boolean
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.Ext.code_signature.valid
Boolean to capture if the digital signature is verified against the binary content. Leave unpopulated if a certificate was unchecked.
boolean
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.Ext.entropy
Entropy calculation of file's header and footer used to check file integrity.
double
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.Ext.entry_modified
Time of last status change. See st_ctim member of struct stat.
double
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.Ext.header_bytes
First 16 bytes of file used to check file integrity.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.Ext.header_data
First 16 bytes of file used to check file integrity.
text
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.Ext.malware_classification.features.data.buffer
The features extracted from this file and evaluated by the model. Usually an array of floats. Likely zlib-encoded.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.Ext.malware_classification.features.data.decompressed_size
The decompressed size of buffer.
integer
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.Ext.malware_classification.features.data.encoding
The encoding of buffer (e.g. zlib).
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.Ext.malware_classification.identifier
The model's unique identifier.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.Ext.malware_classification.score
The score produced by the classification model.
double
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.Ext.malware_classification.threshold
The score threshold for the model. Files that score above this threshold are considered malicious.
double
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.Ext.malware_classification.upx_packed
Whether UPX packing was detected.
boolean
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.Ext.malware_classification.version
The version of the model used.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.Ext.malware_signature
Nested version of malware_signature fieldset.
nested
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.Ext.malware_signature.all_names
The concatenated names of all yara signatures
text
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.Ext.malware_signature.identifier
Malware artifact identifier.
text
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.Ext.malware_signature.primary
Primary malware signature match.
nested
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.Ext.malware_signature.primary.matches
An array of bytes representing yara signature matches
nested
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.Ext.malware_signature.primary.signature
Primary malware signature match.
nested
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.Ext.malware_signature.primary.signature.hash
Primary malware signature hash.
nested
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.Ext.malware_signature.primary.signature.hash.sha256
Primary malware signature sha256.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.Ext.malware_signature.primary.signature.id
Primary malware signature id.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.Ext.malware_signature.primary.signature.name
Primary malware signature name.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.Ext.malware_signature.secondary
An array of malware signature matches
nested
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.Ext.malware_signature.version
Primary malware signature version.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.Ext.monotonic_id
File event monotonic ID.
unsigned_long
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.Ext.original
Original file information during a modification event.
object
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.Ext.original.gid
Primary group ID (GID) of the file.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.Ext.original.group
Primary group name of the file.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.Ext.original.mode
Original file mode prior to a modification event
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.Ext.original.name
Original file name prior to a modification event
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.Ext.original.owner
File owner's username.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.Ext.original.path
Original file path prior to a modification event
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.Ext.original.uid
The user ID (UID) or security identifier (SID) of the file owner.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.Ext.quarantine_message
Message describing quarantine results.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.Ext.quarantine_path
Path on endpoint the quarantined file was originally.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.Ext.quarantine_result
Boolean representing whether or not file quarantine succeeded.
boolean
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.Ext.temp_file_path
Path on endpoint where a copy of the file is being stored. Used to make ephemeral files retrievable.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.Ext.windows
Platform-specific Windows fields
object
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.Ext.windows.zone_identifier
Windows zone identifier for a file
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.accessed
Last time the file was accessed. Note that not all filesystems keep track of access time.
date
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.attributes
Array of file attributes. Attributes names will vary by platform. Here's a non-exhaustive list of values that are expected in this field: archive, compressed, directory, encrypted, execute, hidden, read, readonly, system, write.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.code_signature.exists
Boolean to capture if a signature is present.
boolean
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.code_signature.signing_id
The identifier used to sign the process. This is used to identify the application manufactured by a software vendor. The field is relevant to Apple *OS only.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.code_signature.status
Additional information about the certificate status. This is useful for logging cryptographic errors with the certificate validity or trust status. Leave unpopulated if the validity or trust of the certificate was unchecked.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.code_signature.subject_name
Subject name of the code signer
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.code_signature.team_id
The team identifier used to sign the process. This is used to identify the team or vendor of a software product. The field is relevant to Apple *OS only.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.code_signature.trusted
Stores the trust status of the certificate chain. Validating the trust of the certificate chain may be complicated, and this field should only be populated by tools that actively check the status.
boolean
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.code_signature.valid
Boolean to capture if the digital signature is verified against the binary content. Leave unpopulated if a certificate was unchecked.
boolean
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.created
File creation time. Note that not all filesystems store the creation time.
date
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.ctime
Last time the file attributes or metadata changed. Note that changes to the file content will update mtime. This implies ctime will be adjusted at the same time, since mtime is an attribute of the file.
date
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.device
Device that is the source of the file.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.directory
Directory where the file is located. It should include the drive letter, when appropriate.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.drive_letter
Drive letter where the file is located. This field is only relevant on Windows. The value should be uppercase, and not include the colon.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.elf.architecture
Machine architecture of the ELF file.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.elf.byte_order
Byte sequence of ELF file.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.elf.cpu_type
CPU type of the ELF file.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.elf.creation_date
Extracted when possible from the file's metadata. Indicates when it was built or compiled. It can also be faked by malware creators.
date
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.elf.exports
List of exported element names and types.
flattened
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.elf.header.abi_version
Version of the ELF Application Binary Interface (ABI).
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.elf.header.class
Header class of the ELF file.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.elf.header.data
Data table of the ELF header.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.elf.header.entrypoint
Header entrypoint of the ELF file.
long
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.elf.header.object_version
"0x1" for original ELF files.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.elf.header.os_abi
Application Binary Interface (ABI) of the Linux OS.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.elf.header.type
Header type of the ELF file.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.elf.header.version
Version of the ELF header.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.elf.imports
List of imported element names and types.
flattened
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.elf.sections
An array containing an object for each section of the ELF file. The keys that should be present in these objects are defined by sub-fields underneath elf.sections.*.
nested
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.elf.sections.chi2
Chi-square probability distribution of the section.
long
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.elf.sections.entropy
Shannon entropy calculation from the section.
long
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.elf.sections.flags
ELF Section List flags.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.elf.sections.name
ELF Section List name.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.elf.sections.physical_offset
ELF Section List offset.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.elf.sections.physical_size
ELF Section List physical size.
long
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.elf.sections.type
ELF Section List type.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.elf.sections.virtual_address
ELF Section List virtual address.
long
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.elf.sections.virtual_size
ELF Section List virtual size.
long
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.elf.segments
An array containing an object for each segment of the ELF file. The keys that should be present in these objects are defined by sub-fields underneath elf.segments.*.
nested
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.elf.segments.sections
ELF object segment sections.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.elf.segments.type
ELF object segment type.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.elf.shared_libraries
List of shared libraries used by this ELF object.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.elf.telfhash
telfhash symbol hash for ELF file.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.extension
File extension, excluding the leading dot. Note that when the file name has multiple extensions (example.tar.gz), only the last one should be captured ("gz", not "tar.gz").
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.gid
Primary group ID (GID) of the file.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.group
Primary group name of the file.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.hash.md5
MD5 hash.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.hash.sha1
SHA1 hash.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.hash.sha256
SHA256 hash.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.hash.sha512
SHA512 hash.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.hash.ssdeep
SSDEEP hash.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.inode
Inode representing the file in the filesystem.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.mime_type
MIME type should identify the format of the file or stream of bytes using https://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types/media-types.xhtml[IANA official types], where possible. When more than one type is applicable, the most specific type should be used.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.mode
Mode of the file in octal representation.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.mtime
Last time the file content was modified.
date
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.name
Name of the file including the extension, without the directory.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.owner
File owner's username.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.path
Full path to the file, including the file name. It should include the drive letter, when appropriate.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.pe.architecture
CPU architecture target for the file.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.pe.company
Internal company name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.pe.description
Internal description of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.pe.file_version
Internal version of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.pe.imphash
A hash of the imports in a PE file. An imphash -- or import hash -- can be used to fingerprint binaries even after recompilation or other code-level transformations have occurred, which would change more traditional hash values. Learn more at https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/01/tracking-malware-import-hashing.html.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.pe.original_file_name
Internal name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.pe.product
Internal product name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.size
File size in bytes. Only relevant when file.type is "file".
long
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.target_path
Target path for symlinks.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.type
File type (file, dir, or symlink).
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.file.uid
The user ID (UID) or security identifier (SID) of the file owner.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.first_seen
The date and time when intelligence source first reported sighting this indicator.
date
threat.enrichments.indicator.geo.city_name
City name.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.geo.continent_code
Two-letter code representing continent's name.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.geo.continent_name
Name of the continent.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.geo.country_iso_code
Country ISO code.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.geo.country_name
Country name.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.geo.location
Longitude and latitude.
geo_point
threat.enrichments.indicator.geo.name
User-defined description of a location, at the level of granularity they care about. Could be the name of their data centers, the floor number, if this describes a local physical entity, city names. Not typically used in automated geolocation.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.geo.postal_code
Postal code associated with the location. Values appropriate for this field may also be known as a postcode or ZIP code and will vary widely from country to country.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.geo.region_iso_code
Region ISO code.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.geo.region_name
Region name.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.geo.timezone
The time zone of the location, such as IANA time zone name.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.hash.md5
MD5 hash.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.hash.sha1
SHA1 hash.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.hash.sha256
SHA256 hash.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.hash.sha512
SHA512 hash.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.hash.ssdeep
SSDEEP hash.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.ip
Identifies a threat indicator as an IP address (irrespective of direction).
ip
threat.enrichments.indicator.last_seen
The date and time when intelligence source last reported sighting this indicator.
date
threat.enrichments.indicator.marking.tlp
Traffic Light Protocol sharing markings. Recommended values are: * WHITE * GREEN * AMBER * RED
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.modified_at
The date and time when intelligence source last modified information for this indicator.
date
threat.enrichments.indicator.pe.architecture
CPU architecture target for the file.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.pe.company
Internal company name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.pe.description
Internal description of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.pe.file_version
Internal version of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.pe.imphash
A hash of the imports in a PE file. An imphash -- or import hash -- can be used to fingerprint binaries even after recompilation or other code-level transformations have occurred, which would change more traditional hash values. Learn more at https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/01/tracking-malware-import-hashing.html.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.pe.original_file_name
Internal name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.pe.product
Internal product name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.port
Identifies a threat indicator as a port number (irrespective of direction).
long
threat.enrichments.indicator.provider
The name of the indicator's provider.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.reference
Reference URL linking to additional information about this indicator.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.registry.data.bytes
Original bytes written with base64 encoding. For Windows registry operations, such as SetValueEx and RegQueryValueEx, this corresponds to the data pointed by lp_data. This is optional but provides better recoverability and should be populated for REG_BINARY encoded values.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.registry.data.strings
Content when writing string types. Populated as an array when writing string data to the registry. For single string registry types (REG_SZ, REG_EXPAND_SZ), this should be an array with one string. For sequences of string with REG_MULTI_SZ, this array will be variable length. For numeric data, such as REG_DWORD and REG_QWORD, this should be populated with the decimal representation (e.g "1").
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.registry.data.type
Standard registry type for encoding contents
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.registry.hive
Abbreviated name for the hive.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.registry.key
Hive-relative path of keys.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.registry.path
Full path, including hive, key and value
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.registry.value
Name of the value written.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.scanner_stats
Count of AV/EDR vendors that successfully detected malicious file or URL.
long
threat.enrichments.indicator.sightings
Number of times this indicator was observed conducting threat activity.
long
threat.enrichments.indicator.type
Type of indicator as represented by Cyber Observable in STIX 2.0. Recommended values: * autonomous-system * artifact * directory * domain-name * email-addr * file * ipv4-addr * ipv6-addr * mac-addr * mutex * port * process * software * url * user-account * windows-registry-key * x509-certificate
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.url.domain
Domain of the url, such as "www.elastic.co". In some cases a URL may refer to an IP and/or port directly, without a domain name. In this case, the IP address would go to the domain field. If the URL contains a literal IPv6 address enclosed by [ and ] (IETF RFC 2732), the [ and ] characters should also be captured in the domain field.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.url.extension
The field contains the file extension from the original request url, excluding the leading dot. The file extension is only set if it exists, as not every url has a file extension. The leading period must not be included. For example, the value must be "png", not ".png". Note that when the file name has multiple extensions (example.tar.gz), only the last one should be captured ("gz", not "tar.gz").
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.url.fragment
Portion of the url after the #, such as "top". The # is not part of the fragment.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.url.full
If full URLs are important to your use case, they should be stored in url.full, whether this field is reconstructed or present in the event source.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.url.original
Unmodified original url as seen in the event source. Note that in network monitoring, the observed URL may be a full URL, whereas in access logs, the URL is often just represented as a path. This field is meant to represent the URL as it was observed, complete or not.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.url.password
Password of the request.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.url.path
Path of the request, such as "/search".
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.url.port
Port of the request, such as 443.
long
threat.enrichments.indicator.url.query
The query field describes the query string of the request, such as "q=elasticsearch". The ? is excluded from the query string. If a URL contains no ?, there is no query field. If there is a ? but no query, the query field exists with an empty string. The exists query can be used to differentiate between the two cases.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.url.registered_domain
The highest registered url domain, stripped of the subdomain. For example, the registered domain for "foo.example.com" is "example.com". This value can be determined precisely with a list like the public suffix list (http://publicsuffix.org). Trying to approximate this by simply taking the last two labels will not work well for TLDs such as "co.uk".
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.url.scheme
Scheme of the request, such as "https". Note: The : is not part of the scheme.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.url.subdomain
The subdomain portion of a fully qualified domain name includes all of the names except the host name under the registered_domain. In a partially qualified domain, or if the the qualification level of the full name cannot be determined, subdomain contains all of the names below the registered domain. For example the subdomain portion of "www.east.mydomain.co.uk" is "east". If the domain has multiple levels of subdomain, such as "sub2.sub1.example.com", the subdomain field should contain "sub2.sub1", with no trailing period.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.url.top_level_domain
The effective top level domain (eTLD), also known as the domain suffix, is the last part of the domain name. For example, the top level domain for example.com is "com". This value can be determined precisely with a list like the public suffix list (http://publicsuffix.org). Trying to approximate this by simply taking the last label will not work well for effective TLDs such as "co.uk".
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.url.username
Username of the request.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.x509.alternative_names
List of subject alternative names (SAN). Name types vary by certificate authority and certificate type but commonly contain IP addresses, DNS names (and wildcards), and email addresses.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.x509.issuer.common_name
List of common name (CN) of issuing certificate authority.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.x509.issuer.country
List of country (C) codes
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.x509.issuer.distinguished_name
Distinguished name (DN) of issuing certificate authority.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.x509.issuer.locality
List of locality names (L)
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.x509.issuer.organization
List of organizations (O) of issuing certificate authority.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.x509.issuer.organizational_unit
List of organizational units (OU) of issuing certificate authority.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.x509.issuer.state_or_province
List of state or province names (ST, S, or P)
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.x509.not_after
Time at which the certificate is no longer considered valid.
date
threat.enrichments.indicator.x509.not_before
Time at which the certificate is first considered valid.
date
threat.enrichments.indicator.x509.public_key_algorithm
Algorithm used to generate the public key.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.x509.public_key_curve
The curve used by the elliptic curve public key algorithm. This is algorithm specific.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.x509.public_key_exponent
Exponent used to derive the public key. This is algorithm specific.
long
threat.enrichments.indicator.x509.public_key_size
The size of the public key space in bits.
long
threat.enrichments.indicator.x509.serial_number
Unique serial number issued by the certificate authority. For consistency, if this value is alphanumeric, it should be formatted without colons and uppercase characters.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.x509.signature_algorithm
Identifier for certificate signature algorithm. We recommend using names found in Go Lang Crypto library. See https://github.com/golang/go/blob/go1.14/src/crypto/x509/x509.go#L337-L353.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.x509.subject.common_name
List of common names (CN) of subject.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.x509.subject.country
List of country (C) code
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.x509.subject.distinguished_name
Distinguished name (DN) of the certificate subject entity.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.x509.subject.locality
List of locality names (L)
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.x509.subject.organization
List of organizations (O) of subject.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.x509.subject.organizational_unit
List of organizational units (OU) of subject.
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.x509.subject.state_or_province
List of state or province names (ST, S, or P)
keyword
threat.enrichments.indicator.x509.version_number
Version of x509 format.
keyword
threat.enrichments.matched.atomic
Identifies the atomic indicator value that matched a local environment endpoint or network event.
keyword
threat.enrichments.matched.field
Identifies the field of the atomic indicator that matched a local environment endpoint or network event.
keyword
threat.enrichments.matched.id
Identifies the _id of the indicator document enriching the event.
keyword
threat.enrichments.matched.index
Identifies the _index of the indicator document enriching the event.
keyword
threat.enrichments.matched.type
Identifies the type of match that caused the event to be enriched with the given indicator
keyword
threat.framework
Name of the threat framework used to further categorize and classify the tactic and technique of the reported threat. Framework classification can be provided by detecting systems, evaluated at ingest time, or retrospectively tagged to events.
keyword
threat.group.alias
The alias(es) of the group for a set of related intrusion activity that are tracked by a common name in the security community. While not required, you can use a MITRE ATT&CK® group alias(es).
keyword
threat.group.id
The id of the group for a set of related intrusion activity that are tracked by a common name in the security community. While not required, you can use a MITRE ATT&CK® group id.
keyword
threat.group.name
The name of the group for a set of related intrusion activity that are tracked by a common name in the security community. While not required, you can use a MITRE ATT&CK® group name.
keyword
threat.group.reference
The reference URL of the group for a set of related intrusion activity that are tracked by a common name in the security community. While not required, you can use a MITRE ATT&CK® group reference URL.
keyword
threat.indicator.as.number
Unique number allocated to the autonomous system. The autonomous system number (ASN) uniquely identifies each network on the Internet.
long
threat.indicator.as.organization.name
Organization name.
keyword
threat.indicator.confidence
Identifies the confidence rating assigned by the provider using STIX confidence scales. Recommended values: * Not Specified, None, Low, Medium, High * 0-10 * Admirality Scale (1-6) * DNI Scale (5-95) * WEP Scale (Impossible - Certain)
keyword
threat.indicator.description
Describes the type of action conducted by the threat.
keyword
threat.indicator.email.address
Identifies a threat indicator as an email address (irrespective of direction).
keyword
threat.indicator.file.Ext
Object for all custom defined fields to live in.
object
threat.indicator.file.Ext.code_signature
Nested version of ECS code_signature fieldset.
nested
threat.indicator.file.Ext.code_signature.exists
Boolean to capture if a signature is present.
boolean
threat.indicator.file.Ext.code_signature.status
Additional information about the certificate status. This is useful for logging cryptographic errors with the certificate validity or trust status. Leave unpopulated if the validity or trust of the certificate was unchecked.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.Ext.code_signature.subject_name
Subject name of the code signer
keyword
threat.indicator.file.Ext.code_signature.trusted
Stores the trust status of the certificate chain. Validating the trust of the certificate chain may be complicated, and this field should only be populated by tools that actively check the status.
boolean
threat.indicator.file.Ext.code_signature.valid
Boolean to capture if the digital signature is verified against the binary content. Leave unpopulated if a certificate was unchecked.
boolean
threat.indicator.file.Ext.entropy
Entropy calculation of file's header and footer used to check file integrity.
double
threat.indicator.file.Ext.entry_modified
Time of last status change. See st_ctim member of struct stat.
double
threat.indicator.file.Ext.header_bytes
First 16 bytes of file used to check file integrity.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.Ext.header_data
First 16 bytes of file used to check file integrity.
text
threat.indicator.file.Ext.malware_classification.features.data.buffer
The features extracted from this file and evaluated by the model. Usually an array of floats. Likely zlib-encoded.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.Ext.malware_classification.features.data.decompressed_size
The decompressed size of buffer.
integer
threat.indicator.file.Ext.malware_classification.features.data.encoding
The encoding of buffer (e.g. zlib).
keyword
threat.indicator.file.Ext.malware_classification.identifier
The model's unique identifier.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.Ext.malware_classification.score
The score produced by the classification model.
double
threat.indicator.file.Ext.malware_classification.threshold
The score threshold for the model. Files that score above this threshold are considered malicious.
double
threat.indicator.file.Ext.malware_classification.upx_packed
Whether UPX packing was detected.
boolean
threat.indicator.file.Ext.malware_classification.version
The version of the model used.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.Ext.malware_signature
Nested version of malware_signature fieldset.
nested
threat.indicator.file.Ext.malware_signature.all_names
The concatenated names of all yara signatures
text
threat.indicator.file.Ext.malware_signature.identifier
Malware artifact identifier.
text
threat.indicator.file.Ext.malware_signature.primary
Primary malware signature match.
nested
threat.indicator.file.Ext.malware_signature.primary.matches
An array of bytes representing yara signature matches
nested
threat.indicator.file.Ext.malware_signature.primary.signature
Primary malware signature match.
nested
threat.indicator.file.Ext.malware_signature.primary.signature.hash
Primary malware signature hash.
nested
threat.indicator.file.Ext.malware_signature.primary.signature.hash.sha256
Primary malware signature sha256.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.Ext.malware_signature.primary.signature.id
Primary malware signature id.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.Ext.malware_signature.primary.signature.name
Primary malware signature name.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.Ext.malware_signature.secondary
An array of malware signature matches
nested
threat.indicator.file.Ext.malware_signature.version
Primary malware signature version.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.Ext.monotonic_id
File event monotonic ID.
unsigned_long
threat.indicator.file.Ext.original
Original file information during a modification event.
object
threat.indicator.file.Ext.original.gid
Primary group ID (GID) of the file.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.Ext.original.group
Primary group name of the file.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.Ext.original.mode
Original file mode prior to a modification event
keyword
threat.indicator.file.Ext.original.name
Original file name prior to a modification event
keyword
threat.indicator.file.Ext.original.owner
File owner's username.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.Ext.original.path
Original file path prior to a modification event
keyword
threat.indicator.file.Ext.original.uid
The user ID (UID) or security identifier (SID) of the file owner.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.Ext.quarantine_message
Message describing quarantine results.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.Ext.quarantine_path
Path on endpoint the quarantined file was originally.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.Ext.quarantine_result
Boolean representing whether or not file quarantine succeeded.
boolean
threat.indicator.file.Ext.temp_file_path
Path on endpoint where a copy of the file is being stored. Used to make ephemeral files retrievable.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.Ext.windows
Platform-specific Windows fields
object
threat.indicator.file.Ext.windows.zone_identifier
Windows zone identifier for a file
keyword
threat.indicator.file.accessed
Last time the file was accessed. Note that not all filesystems keep track of access time.
date
threat.indicator.file.attributes
Array of file attributes. Attributes names will vary by platform. Here's a non-exhaustive list of values that are expected in this field: archive, compressed, directory, encrypted, execute, hidden, read, readonly, system, write.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.code_signature.exists
Boolean to capture if a signature is present.
boolean
threat.indicator.file.code_signature.signing_id
The identifier used to sign the process. This is used to identify the application manufactured by a software vendor. The field is relevant to Apple *OS only.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.code_signature.status
Additional information about the certificate status. This is useful for logging cryptographic errors with the certificate validity or trust status. Leave unpopulated if the validity or trust of the certificate was unchecked.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.code_signature.subject_name
Subject name of the code signer
keyword
threat.indicator.file.code_signature.team_id
The team identifier used to sign the process. This is used to identify the team or vendor of a software product. The field is relevant to Apple *OS only.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.code_signature.trusted
Stores the trust status of the certificate chain. Validating the trust of the certificate chain may be complicated, and this field should only be populated by tools that actively check the status.
boolean
threat.indicator.file.code_signature.valid
Boolean to capture if the digital signature is verified against the binary content. Leave unpopulated if a certificate was unchecked.
boolean
threat.indicator.file.created
File creation time. Note that not all filesystems store the creation time.
date
threat.indicator.file.ctime
Last time the file attributes or metadata changed. Note that changes to the file content will update mtime. This implies ctime will be adjusted at the same time, since mtime is an attribute of the file.
date
threat.indicator.file.device
Device that is the source of the file.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.directory
Directory where the file is located. It should include the drive letter, when appropriate.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.drive_letter
Drive letter where the file is located. This field is only relevant on Windows. The value should be uppercase, and not include the colon.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.elf.architecture
Machine architecture of the ELF file.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.elf.byte_order
Byte sequence of ELF file.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.elf.cpu_type
CPU type of the ELF file.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.elf.creation_date
Extracted when possible from the file's metadata. Indicates when it was built or compiled. It can also be faked by malware creators.
date
threat.indicator.file.elf.exports
List of exported element names and types.
flattened
threat.indicator.file.elf.header.abi_version
Version of the ELF Application Binary Interface (ABI).
keyword
threat.indicator.file.elf.header.class
Header class of the ELF file.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.elf.header.data
Data table of the ELF header.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.elf.header.entrypoint
Header entrypoint of the ELF file.
long
threat.indicator.file.elf.header.object_version
"0x1" for original ELF files.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.elf.header.os_abi
Application Binary Interface (ABI) of the Linux OS.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.elf.header.type
Header type of the ELF file.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.elf.header.version
Version of the ELF header.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.elf.imports
List of imported element names and types.
flattened
threat.indicator.file.elf.sections
An array containing an object for each section of the ELF file. The keys that should be present in these objects are defined by sub-fields underneath elf.sections.*.
nested
threat.indicator.file.elf.sections.chi2
Chi-square probability distribution of the section.
long
threat.indicator.file.elf.sections.entropy
Shannon entropy calculation from the section.
long
threat.indicator.file.elf.sections.flags
ELF Section List flags.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.elf.sections.name
ELF Section List name.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.elf.sections.physical_offset
ELF Section List offset.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.elf.sections.physical_size
ELF Section List physical size.
long
threat.indicator.file.elf.sections.type
ELF Section List type.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.elf.sections.virtual_address
ELF Section List virtual address.
long
threat.indicator.file.elf.sections.virtual_size
ELF Section List virtual size.
long
threat.indicator.file.elf.segments
An array containing an object for each segment of the ELF file. The keys that should be present in these objects are defined by sub-fields underneath elf.segments.*.
nested
threat.indicator.file.elf.segments.sections
ELF object segment sections.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.elf.segments.type
ELF object segment type.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.elf.shared_libraries
List of shared libraries used by this ELF object.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.elf.telfhash
telfhash symbol hash for ELF file.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.extension
File extension, excluding the leading dot. Note that when the file name has multiple extensions (example.tar.gz), only the last one should be captured ("gz", not "tar.gz").
keyword
threat.indicator.file.gid
Primary group ID (GID) of the file.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.group
Primary group name of the file.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.hash.md5
MD5 hash.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.hash.sha1
SHA1 hash.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.hash.sha256
SHA256 hash.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.hash.sha512
SHA512 hash.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.hash.ssdeep
SSDEEP hash.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.inode
Inode representing the file in the filesystem.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.mime_type
MIME type should identify the format of the file or stream of bytes using https://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types/media-types.xhtml[IANA official types], where possible. When more than one type is applicable, the most specific type should be used.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.mode
Mode of the file in octal representation.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.mtime
Last time the file content was modified.
date
threat.indicator.file.name
Name of the file including the extension, without the directory.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.owner
File owner's username.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.path
Full path to the file, including the file name. It should include the drive letter, when appropriate.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.pe.architecture
CPU architecture target for the file.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.pe.company
Internal company name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.pe.description
Internal description of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.pe.file_version
Internal version of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.pe.imphash
A hash of the imports in a PE file. An imphash -- or import hash -- can be used to fingerprint binaries even after recompilation or other code-level transformations have occurred, which would change more traditional hash values. Learn more at https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/01/tracking-malware-import-hashing.html.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.pe.original_file_name
Internal name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.pe.product
Internal product name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.size
File size in bytes. Only relevant when file.type is "file".
long
threat.indicator.file.target_path
Target path for symlinks.
keyword
threat.indicator.file.type
File type (file, dir, or symlink).
keyword
threat.indicator.file.uid
The user ID (UID) or security identifier (SID) of the file owner.
keyword
threat.indicator.first_seen
The date and time when intelligence source first reported sighting this indicator.
date
threat.indicator.geo.city_name
City name.
keyword
threat.indicator.geo.continent_code
Two-letter code representing continent's name.
keyword
threat.indicator.geo.continent_name
Name of the continent.
keyword
threat.indicator.geo.country_iso_code
Country ISO code.
keyword
threat.indicator.geo.country_name
Country name.
keyword
threat.indicator.geo.location
Longitude and latitude.
geo_point
threat.indicator.geo.name
User-defined description of a location, at the level of granularity they care about. Could be the name of their data centers, the floor number, if this describes a local physical entity, city names. Not typically used in automated geolocation.
keyword
threat.indicator.geo.postal_code
Postal code associated with the location. Values appropriate for this field may also be known as a postcode or ZIP code and will vary widely from country to country.
keyword
threat.indicator.geo.region_iso_code
Region ISO code.
keyword
threat.indicator.geo.region_name
Region name.
keyword
threat.indicator.geo.timezone
The time zone of the location, such as IANA time zone name.
keyword
threat.indicator.hash.md5
MD5 hash.
keyword
threat.indicator.hash.sha1
SHA1 hash.
keyword
threat.indicator.hash.sha256
SHA256 hash.
keyword
threat.indicator.hash.sha512
SHA512 hash.
keyword
threat.indicator.hash.ssdeep
SSDEEP hash.
keyword
threat.indicator.ip
Identifies a threat indicator as an IP address (irrespective of direction).
ip
threat.indicator.last_seen
The date and time when intelligence source last reported sighting this indicator.
date
threat.indicator.marking.tlp
Traffic Light Protocol sharing markings. Recommended values are: * WHITE * GREEN * AMBER * RED
keyword
threat.indicator.modified_at
The date and time when intelligence source last modified information for this indicator.
date
threat.indicator.pe.architecture
CPU architecture target for the file.
keyword
threat.indicator.pe.company
Internal company name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
threat.indicator.pe.description
Internal description of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
threat.indicator.pe.file_version
Internal version of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
threat.indicator.pe.imphash
A hash of the imports in a PE file. An imphash -- or import hash -- can be used to fingerprint binaries even after recompilation or other code-level transformations have occurred, which would change more traditional hash values. Learn more at https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/01/tracking-malware-import-hashing.html.
keyword
threat.indicator.pe.original_file_name
Internal name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
threat.indicator.pe.product
Internal product name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
threat.indicator.port
Identifies a threat indicator as a port number (irrespective of direction).
long
threat.indicator.provider
The name of the indicator's provider.
keyword
threat.indicator.reference
Reference URL linking to additional information about this indicator.
keyword
threat.indicator.registry.data.bytes
Original bytes written with base64 encoding. For Windows registry operations, such as SetValueEx and RegQueryValueEx, this corresponds to the data pointed by lp_data. This is optional but provides better recoverability and should be populated for REG_BINARY encoded values.
keyword
threat.indicator.registry.data.strings
Content when writing string types. Populated as an array when writing string data to the registry. For single string registry types (REG_SZ, REG_EXPAND_SZ), this should be an array with one string. For sequences of string with REG_MULTI_SZ, this array will be variable length. For numeric data, such as REG_DWORD and REG_QWORD, this should be populated with the decimal representation (e.g "1").
keyword
threat.indicator.registry.data.type
Standard registry type for encoding contents
keyword
threat.indicator.registry.hive
Abbreviated name for the hive.
keyword
threat.indicator.registry.key
Hive-relative path of keys.
keyword
threat.indicator.registry.path
Full path, including hive, key and value
keyword
threat.indicator.registry.value
Name of the value written.
keyword
threat.indicator.scanner_stats
Count of AV/EDR vendors that successfully detected malicious file or URL.
long
threat.indicator.sightings
Number of times this indicator was observed conducting threat activity.
long
threat.indicator.type
Type of indicator as represented by Cyber Observable in STIX 2.0. Recommended values: * autonomous-system * artifact * directory * domain-name * email-addr * file * ipv4-addr * ipv6-addr * mac-addr * mutex * port * process * software * url * user-account * windows-registry-key * x509-certificate
keyword
threat.indicator.url.domain
Domain of the url, such as "www.elastic.co". In some cases a URL may refer to an IP and/or port directly, without a domain name. In this case, the IP address would go to the domain field. If the URL contains a literal IPv6 address enclosed by [ and ] (IETF RFC 2732), the [ and ] characters should also be captured in the domain field.
keyword
threat.indicator.url.extension
The field contains the file extension from the original request url, excluding the leading dot. The file extension is only set if it exists, as not every url has a file extension. The leading period must not be included. For example, the value must be "png", not ".png". Note that when the file name has multiple extensions (example.tar.gz), only the last one should be captured ("gz", not "tar.gz").
keyword
threat.indicator.url.fragment
Portion of the url after the #, such as "top". The # is not part of the fragment.
keyword
threat.indicator.url.full
If full URLs are important to your use case, they should be stored in url.full, whether this field is reconstructed or present in the event source.
keyword
threat.indicator.url.original
Unmodified original url as seen in the event source. Note that in network monitoring, the observed URL may be a full URL, whereas in access logs, the URL is often just represented as a path. This field is meant to represent the URL as it was observed, complete or not.
keyword
threat.indicator.url.password
Password of the request.
keyword
threat.indicator.url.path
Path of the request, such as "/search".
keyword
threat.indicator.url.port
Port of the request, such as 443.
long
threat.indicator.url.query
The query field describes the query string of the request, such as "q=elasticsearch". The ? is excluded from the query string. If a URL contains no ?, there is no query field. If there is a ? but no query, the query field exists with an empty string. The exists query can be used to differentiate between the two cases.
keyword
threat.indicator.url.registered_domain
The highest registered url domain, stripped of the subdomain. For example, the registered domain for "foo.example.com" is "example.com". This value can be determined precisely with a list like the public suffix list (http://publicsuffix.org). Trying to approximate this by simply taking the last two labels will not work well for TLDs such as "co.uk".
keyword
threat.indicator.url.scheme
Scheme of the request, such as "https". Note: The : is not part of the scheme.
keyword
threat.indicator.url.subdomain
The subdomain portion of a fully qualified domain name includes all of the names except the host name under the registered_domain. In a partially qualified domain, or if the the qualification level of the full name cannot be determined, subdomain contains all of the names below the registered domain. For example the subdomain portion of "www.east.mydomain.co.uk" is "east". If the domain has multiple levels of subdomain, such as "sub2.sub1.example.com", the subdomain field should contain "sub2.sub1", with no trailing period.
keyword
threat.indicator.url.top_level_domain
The effective top level domain (eTLD), also known as the domain suffix, is the last part of the domain name. For example, the top level domain for example.com is "com". This value can be determined precisely with a list like the public suffix list (http://publicsuffix.org). Trying to approximate this by simply taking the last label will not work well for effective TLDs such as "co.uk".
keyword
threat.indicator.url.username
Username of the request.
keyword
threat.indicator.x509.alternative_names
List of subject alternative names (SAN). Name types vary by certificate authority and certificate type but commonly contain IP addresses, DNS names (and wildcards), and email addresses.
keyword
threat.indicator.x509.issuer.common_name
List of common name (CN) of issuing certificate authority.
keyword
threat.indicator.x509.issuer.country
List of country (C) codes
keyword
threat.indicator.x509.issuer.distinguished_name
Distinguished name (DN) of issuing certificate authority.
keyword
threat.indicator.x509.issuer.locality
List of locality names (L)
keyword
threat.indicator.x509.issuer.organization
List of organizations (O) of issuing certificate authority.
keyword
threat.indicator.x509.issuer.organizational_unit
List of organizational units (OU) of issuing certificate authority.
keyword
threat.indicator.x509.issuer.state_or_province
List of state or province names (ST, S, or P)
keyword
threat.indicator.x509.not_after
Time at which the certificate is no longer considered valid.
date
threat.indicator.x509.not_before
Time at which the certificate is first considered valid.
date
threat.indicator.x509.public_key_algorithm
Algorithm used to generate the public key.
keyword
threat.indicator.x509.public_key_curve
The curve used by the elliptic curve public key algorithm. This is algorithm specific.
keyword
threat.indicator.x509.public_key_exponent
Exponent used to derive the public key. This is algorithm specific.
long
threat.indicator.x509.public_key_size
The size of the public key space in bits.
long
threat.indicator.x509.serial_number
Unique serial number issued by the certificate authority. For consistency, if this value is alphanumeric, it should be formatted without colons and uppercase characters.
keyword
threat.indicator.x509.signature_algorithm
Identifier for certificate signature algorithm. We recommend using names found in Go Lang Crypto library. See https://github.com/golang/go/blob/go1.14/src/crypto/x509/x509.go#L337-L353.
keyword
threat.indicator.x509.subject.common_name
List of common names (CN) of subject.
keyword
threat.indicator.x509.subject.country
List of country (C) code
keyword
threat.indicator.x509.subject.distinguished_name
Distinguished name (DN) of the certificate subject entity.
keyword
threat.indicator.x509.subject.locality
List of locality names (L)
keyword
threat.indicator.x509.subject.organization
List of organizations (O) of subject.
keyword
threat.indicator.x509.subject.organizational_unit
List of organizational units (OU) of subject.
keyword
threat.indicator.x509.subject.state_or_province
List of state or province names (ST, S, or P)
keyword
threat.indicator.x509.version_number
Version of x509 format.
keyword
threat.software.id
The id of the software used by this threat to conduct behavior commonly modeled using MITRE ATT&CK®. While not required, you can use a MITRE ATT&CK® software id.
keyword
threat.software.name
The name of the software used by this threat to conduct behavior commonly modeled using MITRE ATT&CK®. While not required, you can use a MITRE ATT&CK® software name.
keyword
threat.software.platforms
The platforms of the software used by this threat to conduct behavior commonly modeled using MITRE ATT&CK®. While not required, you can use a MITRE ATT&CK® software platforms. Recommended Values: * AWS * Azure * Azure AD * GCP * Linux * macOS * Network * Office 365 * SaaS * Windows
keyword
threat.software.reference
The reference URL of the software used by this threat to conduct behavior commonly modeled using MITRE ATT&CK®. While not required, you can use a MITRE ATT&CK® software reference URL.
keyword
threat.software.type
The type of software used by this threat to conduct behavior commonly modeled using MITRE ATT&CK®. While not required, you can use a MITRE ATT&CK® software type. Recommended values * Malware * Tool
keyword
threat.tactic.id
The id of tactic used by this threat. You can use a MITRE ATT&CK® tactic, for example. (ex. https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/ )
keyword
threat.tactic.name
Name of the type of tactic used by this threat. You can use a MITRE ATT&CK® tactic, for example. (ex. https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/)
keyword
threat.tactic.reference
The reference url of tactic used by this threat. You can use a MITRE ATT&CK® tactic, for example. (ex. https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/ )
keyword
threat.technique.id
The id of technique used by this threat. You can use a MITRE ATT&CK® technique, for example. (ex. https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/)
keyword
threat.technique.name
The name of technique used by this threat. You can use a MITRE ATT&CK® technique, for example. (ex. https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/)
keyword
threat.technique.reference
The reference url of technique used by this threat. You can use a MITRE ATT&CK® technique, for example. (ex. https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/)
keyword
threat.technique.subtechnique.id
The full id of subtechnique used by this threat. You can use a MITRE ATT&CK® subtechnique, for example. (ex. https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/)
keyword
threat.technique.subtechnique.name
The name of subtechnique used by this threat. You can use a MITRE ATT&CK® subtechnique, for example. (ex. https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/)
keyword
threat.technique.subtechnique.reference
The reference url of subtechnique used by this threat. You can use a MITRE ATT&CK® subtechnique, for example. (ex. https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/)
keyword
user.Ext
Object for all custom defined fields to live in.
object
user.Ext.real
User info prior to any setuid operations.
object
user.Ext.real.id
One or multiple unique identifiers of the user.
keyword
user.Ext.real.name
Short name or login of the user.
keyword
user.domain
Name of the directory the user is a member of. For example, an LDAP or Active Directory domain name.
keyword
user.email
User email address.
keyword
user.full_name
User's full name, if available.
keyword
user.group.Ext
Object for all custom defined fields to live in.
object
user.group.Ext.real
Group info prior to any setgid operations.
object
user.group.Ext.real.id
Unique identifier for the group on the system/platform.
keyword
user.group.Ext.real.name
Name of the group.
keyword
user.group.domain
Name of the directory the group is a member of. For example, an LDAP or Active Directory domain name.
keyword
user.group.id
Unique identifier for the group on the system/platform.
keyword
user.group.name
Name of the group.
keyword
user.hash
Unique user hash to correlate information for a user in anonymized form. Useful if user.id or user.name contain confidential information and cannot be used.
keyword
user.id
Unique identifier of the user.
keyword
user.name
Short name or login of the user.
keyword

file

Exported fields

FieldDescriptionType
@timestamp
Date/time when the event originated. This is the date/time extracted from the event, typically representing when the event was generated by the source. If the event source has no original timestamp, this value is typically populated by the first time the event was received by the pipeline. Required field for all events.
date
agent.id
Unique identifier of this agent (if one exists). Example: For Beats this would be beat.id.
keyword
agent.type
Type of the agent. The agent type always stays the same and should be given by the agent used. In case of Filebeat the agent would always be Filebeat also if two Filebeat instances are run on the same machine.
keyword
agent.version
Version of the agent.
keyword
data_stream.dataset
Data stream dataset name.
constant_keyword
data_stream.namespace
Data stream namespace.
constant_keyword
data_stream.type
Data stream type.
constant_keyword
destination.geo.city_name
City name.
keyword
destination.geo.continent_code
Two-letter code representing continent's name.
keyword
destination.geo.continent_name
Name of the continent.
keyword
destination.geo.country_iso_code
Country ISO code.
keyword
destination.geo.country_name
Country name.
keyword
destination.geo.location
Longitude and latitude.
geo_point
destination.geo.name
User-defined description of a location, at the level of granularity they care about. Could be the name of their data centers, the floor number, if this describes a local physical entity, city names. Not typically used in automated geolocation.
keyword
destination.geo.postal_code
Postal code associated with the location. Values appropriate for this field may also be known as a postcode or ZIP code and will vary widely from country to country.
keyword
destination.geo.region_iso_code
Region ISO code.
keyword
destination.geo.region_name
Region name.
keyword
destination.geo.timezone
The time zone of the location, such as IANA time zone name.
keyword
ecs.version
ECS version this event conforms to. ecs.version is a required field and must exist in all events. When querying across multiple indices -- which may conform to slightly different ECS versions -- this field lets integrations adjust to the schema version of the events.
keyword
event.Ext
Object for all custom defined fields to live in.
object
event.Ext.correlation
Information about event this should be correlated with.
object
event.Ext.correlation.id
ID of event that this event is correlated to, e.g. quarantine event associated with an unquarantine event
keyword
event.action
The action captured by the event. This describes the information in the event. It is more specific than event.category. Examples are group-add, process-started, file-created. The value is normally defined by the implementer.
keyword
event.category
This is one of four ECS Categorization Fields, and indicates the second level in the ECS category hierarchy. event.category represents the "big buckets" of ECS categories. For example, filtering on event.category:process yields all events relating to process activity. This field is closely related to event.type, which is used as a subcategory. This field is an array. This will allow proper categorization of some events that fall in multiple categories.
keyword
event.code
Identification code for this event, if one exists. Some event sources use event codes to identify messages unambiguously, regardless of message language or wording adjustments over time. An example of this is the Windows Event ID.
keyword
event.created
event.created contains the date/time when the event was first read by an agent, or by your pipeline. This field is distinct from @timestamp in that @timestamp typically contain the time extracted from the original event. In most situations, these two timestamps will be slightly different. The difference can be used to calculate the delay between your source generating an event, and the time when your agent first processed it. This can be used to monitor your agent's or pipeline's ability to keep up with your event source. In case the two timestamps are identical, @timestamp should be used.
date
event.dataset
Name of the dataset. If an event source publishes more than one type of log or events (e.g. access log, error log), the dataset is used to specify which one the event comes from. It's recommended but not required to start the dataset name with the module name, followed by a dot, then the dataset name.
keyword
event.hash
Hash (perhaps logstash fingerprint) of raw field to be able to demonstrate log integrity.
keyword
event.id
Unique ID to describe the event.
keyword
event.ingested
Timestamp when an event arrived in the central data store. This is different from @timestamp, which is when the event originally occurred. It's also different from event.created, which is meant to capture the first time an agent saw the event. In normal conditions, assuming no tampering, the timestamps should chronologically look like this: @timestamp < event.created < event.ingested.
date
event.kind
This is one of four ECS Categorization Fields, and indicates the highest level in the ECS category hierarchy. event.kind gives high-level information about what type of information the event contains, without being specific to the contents of the event. For example, values of this field distinguish alert events from metric events. The value of this field can be used to inform how these kinds of events should be handled. They may warrant different retention, different access control, it may also help understand whether the data coming in at a regular interval or not.
keyword
event.module
Name of the module this data is coming from. If your monitoring agent supports the concept of modules or plugins to process events of a given source (e.g. Apache logs), event.module should contain the name of this module.
keyword
event.outcome
This is one of four ECS Categorization Fields, and indicates the lowest level in the ECS category hierarchy. event.outcome simply denotes whether the event represents a success or a failure from the perspective of the entity that produced the event. Note that when a single transaction is described in multiple events, each event may populate different values of event.outcome, according to their perspective. Also note that in the case of a compound event (a single event that contains multiple logical events), this field should be populated with the value that best captures the overall success or failure from the perspective of the event producer. Further note that not all events will have an associated outcome. For example, this field is generally not populated for metric events, events with event.type:info, or any events for which an outcome does not make logical sense.
keyword
event.provider
Source of the event. Event transports such as Syslog or the Windows Event Log typically mention the source of an event. It can be the name of the software that generated the event (e.g. Sysmon, httpd), or of a subsystem of the operating system (kernel, Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing).
keyword
event.sequence
Sequence number of the event. The sequence number is a value published by some event sources, to make the exact ordering of events unambiguous, regardless of the timestamp precision.
long
event.severity
The numeric severity of the event according to your event source. What the different severity values mean can be different between sources and use cases. It's up to the implementer to make sure severities are consistent across events from the same source. The Syslog severity belongs in log.syslog.severity.code. event.severity is meant to represent the severity according to the event source (e.g. firewall, IDS). If the event source does not publish its own severity, you may optionally copy the log.syslog.severity.code to event.severity.
long
event.type
This is one of four ECS Categorization Fields, and indicates the third level in the ECS category hierarchy. event.type represents a categorization "sub-bucket" that, when used along with the event.category field values, enables filtering events down to a level appropriate for single visualization. This field is an array. This will allow proper categorization of some events that fall in multiple event types.
keyword
file.Ext
Object for all custom defined fields to live in.
object
file.Ext.entropy
Entropy calculation of file's header and footer used to check file integrity.
double
file.Ext.header_bytes
First 16 bytes of file used to check file integrity.
keyword
file.Ext.header_data
First 16 bytes of file used to check file integrity.
text
file.Ext.malware_signature
Nested version of malware_signature fieldset.
nested
file.Ext.malware_signature.all_names
The concatenated names of all yara signatures
text
file.Ext.malware_signature.identifier
Malware artifact identifier.
text
file.Ext.malware_signature.primary
Primary malware signature match.
nested
file.Ext.malware_signature.primary.matches
An array of bytes representing yara signature matches
nested
file.Ext.malware_signature.primary.signature
Primary malware signature match.
nested
file.Ext.malware_signature.primary.signature.hash
Primary malware signature hash.
nested
file.Ext.malware_signature.primary.signature.hash.sha256
Primary malware signature sha256.
keyword
file.Ext.malware_signature.primary.signature.id
Primary malware signature id.
keyword
file.Ext.malware_signature.primary.signature.name
Primary malware signature name.
keyword
file.Ext.malware_signature.secondary
An array of malware signature matches
nested
file.Ext.malware_signature.version
Primary malware signature version.
keyword
file.Ext.monotonic_id
File event monotonic ID.
unsigned_long
file.Ext.original
Original file information during a modification event.
object
file.Ext.original.gid
Primary group ID (GID) of the file.
keyword
file.Ext.original.group
Primary group name of the file.
keyword
file.Ext.original.mode
Original file mode prior to a modification event
keyword
file.Ext.original.name
Original file name prior to a modification event
keyword
file.Ext.original.owner
File owner's username.
keyword
file.Ext.original.path
Original file path prior to a modification event
keyword
file.Ext.original.uid
The user ID (UID) or security identifier (SID) of the file owner.
keyword
file.Ext.windows
Platform-specific Windows fields
object
file.Ext.windows.zone_identifier
Windows zone identifier for a file
keyword
file.accessed
Last time the file was accessed. Note that not all filesystems keep track of access time.
date
file.attributes
Array of file attributes. Attributes names will vary by platform. Here's a non-exhaustive list of values that are expected in this field: archive, compressed, directory, encrypted, execute, hidden, read, readonly, system, write.
keyword
file.created
File creation time. Note that not all filesystems store the creation time.
date
file.ctime
Last time the file attributes or metadata changed. Note that changes to the file content will update mtime. This implies ctime will be adjusted at the same time, since mtime is an attribute of the file.
date
file.device
Device that is the source of the file.
keyword
file.directory
Directory where the file is located. It should include the drive letter, when appropriate.
keyword
file.drive_letter
Drive letter where the file is located. This field is only relevant on Windows. The value should be uppercase, and not include the colon.
keyword
file.extension
File extension, excluding the leading dot. Note that when the file name has multiple extensions (example.tar.gz), only the last one should be captured ("gz", not "tar.gz").
keyword
file.gid
Primary group ID (GID) of the file.
keyword
file.group
Primary group name of the file.
keyword
file.hash.md5
MD5 hash.
keyword
file.hash.sha1
SHA1 hash.
keyword
file.hash.sha256
SHA256 hash.
keyword
file.hash.sha512
SHA512 hash.
keyword
file.inode
Inode representing the file in the filesystem.
keyword
file.mime_type
MIME type should identify the format of the file or stream of bytes using https://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types/media-types.xhtml[IANA official types], where possible. When more than one type is applicable, the most specific type should be used.
keyword
file.mode
Mode of the file in octal representation.
keyword
file.mtime
Last time the file content was modified.
date
file.name
Name of the file including the extension, without the directory.
keyword
file.owner
File owner's username.
keyword
file.path
Full path to the file, including the file name. It should include the drive letter, when appropriate.
keyword
file.pe.company
Internal company name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
file.pe.description
Internal description of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
file.pe.file_version
Internal version of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
file.pe.imphash
A hash of the imports in a PE file. An imphash -- or import hash -- can be used to fingerprint binaries even after recompilation or other code-level transformations have occurred, which would change more traditional hash values. Learn more at https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/01/tracking-malware-import-hashing.html.
keyword
file.pe.original_file_name
Internal name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
file.pe.product
Internal product name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
file.size
File size in bytes. Only relevant when file.type is "file".
long
file.target_path
Target path for symlinks.
keyword
file.type
File type (file, dir, or symlink).
keyword
file.uid
The user ID (UID) or security identifier (SID) of the file owner.
keyword
group.Ext
Object for all custom defined fields to live in.
object
group.Ext.real
Group info prior to any setgid operations.
object
group.Ext.real.id
Unique identifier for the group on the system/platform.
keyword
group.Ext.real.name
Name of the group.
keyword
group.domain
Name of the directory the group is a member of. For example, an LDAP or Active Directory domain name.
keyword
group.id
Unique identifier for the group on the system/platform.
keyword
group.name
Name of the group.
keyword
host.architecture
Operating system architecture.
keyword
host.domain
Name of the domain of which the host is a member. For example, on Windows this could be the host's Active Directory domain or NetBIOS domain name. For Linux this could be the domain of the host's LDAP provider.
keyword
host.hostname
Hostname of the host. It normally contains what the hostname command returns on the host machine.
keyword
host.id
Unique host id. As hostname is not always unique, use values that are meaningful in your environment. Example: The current usage of beat.name.
keyword
host.ip
Host ip addresses.
ip
host.mac
Host MAC addresses. The notation format from RFC 7042 is suggested: Each octet (that is, 8-bit byte) is represented by two [uppercase] hexadecimal digits giving the value of the octet as an unsigned integer. Successive octets are separated by a hyphen.
keyword
host.name
Name of the host. It can contain what hostname returns on Unix systems, the fully qualified domain name, or a name specified by the user. The sender decides which value to use.
keyword
host.os.Ext
Object for all custom defined fields to live in.
object
host.os.Ext.variant
A string value or phrase that further aid to classify or qualify the operating system (OS). For example the distribution for a Linux OS will be entered in this field.
keyword
host.os.family
OS family (such as redhat, debian, freebsd, windows).
keyword
host.os.full
Operating system name, including the version or code name.
keyword
host.os.kernel
Operating system kernel version as a raw string.
keyword
host.os.name
Operating system name, without the version.
keyword
host.os.platform
Operating system platform (such centos, ubuntu, windows).
keyword
host.os.version
Operating system version as a raw string.
keyword
host.type
Type of host. For Cloud providers this can be the machine type like t2.medium. If vm, this could be the container, for example, or other information meaningful in your environment.
keyword
host.uptime
Seconds the host has been up.
long
message
For log events the message field contains the log message, optimized for viewing in a log viewer. For structured logs without an original message field, other fields can be concatenated to form a human-readable summary of the event. If multiple messages exist, they can be combined into one message.
text
process.Ext
Object for all custom defined fields to live in.
object
process.Ext.ancestry
An array of entity_ids indicating the ancestors for this event
keyword
process.args_count
Length of the process.args array. This field can be useful for querying or performing bucket analysis on how many arguments were provided to start a process. More arguments may be an indication of suspicious activity.
long
process.entity_id
Unique identifier for the process. The implementation of this is specified by the data source, but some examples of what could be used here are a process-generated UUID, Sysmon Process GUIDs, or a hash of some uniquely identifying components of a process. Constructing a globally unique identifier is a common practice to mitigate PID reuse as well as to identify a specific process over time, across multiple monitored hosts.
keyword
process.executable
Absolute path to the process executable.
keyword
process.name
Process name. Sometimes called program name or similar.
keyword
process.pid
Process id.
long
process.ppid
Parent process' pid.
long
process.thread.id
Thread ID.
long
source.geo.city_name
City name.
keyword
source.geo.continent_code
Two-letter code representing continent's name.
keyword
source.geo.continent_name
Name of the continent.
keyword
source.geo.country_iso_code
Country ISO code.
keyword
source.geo.country_name
Country name.
keyword
source.geo.location
Longitude and latitude.
geo_point
source.geo.name
User-defined description of a location, at the level of granularity they care about. Could be the name of their data centers, the floor number, if this describes a local physical entity, city names. Not typically used in automated geolocation.
keyword
source.geo.postal_code
Postal code associated with the location. Values appropriate for this field may also be known as a postcode or ZIP code and will vary widely from country to country.
keyword
source.geo.region_iso_code
Region ISO code.
keyword
source.geo.region_name
Region name.
keyword
source.geo.timezone
The time zone of the location, such as IANA time zone name.
keyword
user.Ext
Object for all custom defined fields to live in.
object
user.Ext.real
User info prior to any setuid operations.
object
user.Ext.real.id
One or multiple unique identifiers of the user.
keyword
user.Ext.real.name
Short name or login of the user.
keyword
user.domain
Name of the directory the user is a member of. For example, an LDAP or Active Directory domain name.
keyword
user.email
User email address.
keyword
user.full_name
User's full name, if available.
keyword
user.group.Ext
Object for all custom defined fields to live in.
object
user.group.Ext.real
Group info prior to any setgid operations.
object
user.group.Ext.real.id
Unique identifier for the group on the system/platform.
keyword
user.group.Ext.real.name
Name of the group.
keyword
user.group.domain
Name of the directory the group is a member of. For example, an LDAP or Active Directory domain name.
keyword
user.group.id
Unique identifier for the group on the system/platform.
keyword
user.group.name
Name of the group.
keyword
user.hash
Unique user hash to correlate information for a user in anonymized form. Useful if user.id or user.name contain confidential information and cannot be used.
keyword
user.id
Unique identifier of the user.
keyword
user.name
Short name or login of the user.
keyword

library

Exported fields

FieldDescriptionType
@timestamp
Date/time when the event originated. This is the date/time extracted from the event, typically representing when the event was generated by the source. If the event source has no original timestamp, this value is typically populated by the first time the event was received by the pipeline. Required field for all events.
date
agent.id
Unique identifier of this agent (if one exists). Example: For Beats this would be beat.id.
keyword
agent.type
Type of the agent. The agent type always stays the same and should be given by the agent used. In case of Filebeat the agent would always be Filebeat also if two Filebeat instances are run on the same machine.
keyword
agent.version
Version of the agent.
keyword
data_stream.dataset
Data stream dataset name.
constant_keyword
data_stream.namespace
Data stream namespace.
constant_keyword
data_stream.type
Data stream type.
constant_keyword
destination.geo.city_name
City name.
keyword
destination.geo.continent_code
Two-letter code representing continent's name.
keyword
destination.geo.continent_name
Name of the continent.
keyword
destination.geo.country_iso_code
Country ISO code.
keyword
destination.geo.country_name
Country name.
keyword
destination.geo.location
Longitude and latitude.
geo_point
destination.geo.name
User-defined description of a location, at the level of granularity they care about. Could be the name of their data centers, the floor number, if this describes a local physical entity, city names. Not typically used in automated geolocation.
keyword
destination.geo.postal_code
Postal code associated with the location. Values appropriate for this field may also be known as a postcode or ZIP code and will vary widely from country to country.
keyword
destination.geo.region_iso_code
Region ISO code.
keyword
destination.geo.region_name
Region name.
keyword
destination.geo.timezone
The time zone of the location, such as IANA time zone name.
keyword
dll.Ext
Object for all custom defined fields to live in.
object
dll.Ext.code_signature
Nested version of ECS code_signature fieldset.
nested
dll.Ext.code_signature.exists
Boolean to capture if a signature is present.
boolean
dll.Ext.code_signature.status
Additional information about the certificate status. This is useful for logging cryptographic errors with the certificate validity or trust status. Leave unpopulated if the validity or trust of the certificate was unchecked.
keyword
dll.Ext.code_signature.subject_name
Subject name of the code signer
keyword
dll.Ext.code_signature.trusted
Stores the trust status of the certificate chain. Validating the trust of the certificate chain may be complicated, and this field should only be populated by tools that actively check the status.
boolean
dll.Ext.code_signature.valid
Boolean to capture if the digital signature is verified against the binary content. Leave unpopulated if a certificate was unchecked.
boolean
dll.Ext.defense_evasions
List of defense evasions found for this DLL. These defense evasions can make it harder to inspect a process and/or cause abnormal OS behavior. Examples tools that can cause defense evasions include KnownDlls hijacking and PPLDump.
keyword
dll.Ext.load_index
A DLL can be loaded into a process multiple times. This field indicates the Nth time that this DLL has been loaded. The first load index is 1.
unsigned_long
dll.code_signature.exists
Boolean to capture if a signature is present.
boolean
dll.code_signature.signing_id
The identifier used to sign the process. This is used to identify the application manufactured by a software vendor. The field is relevant to Apple *OS only.
keyword
dll.code_signature.status
Additional information about the certificate status. This is useful for logging cryptographic errors with the certificate validity or trust status. Leave unpopulated if the validity or trust of the certificate was unchecked.
keyword
dll.code_signature.subject_name
Subject name of the code signer
keyword
dll.code_signature.team_id
The team identifier used to sign the process. This is used to identify the team or vendor of a software product. The field is relevant to Apple *OS only.
keyword
dll.code_signature.trusted
Stores the trust status of the certificate chain. Validating the trust of the certificate chain may be complicated, and this field should only be populated by tools that actively check the status.
boolean
dll.code_signature.valid
Boolean to capture if the digital signature is verified against the binary content. Leave unpopulated if a certificate was unchecked.
boolean
dll.hash.md5
MD5 hash.
keyword
dll.hash.sha1
SHA1 hash.
keyword
dll.hash.sha256
SHA256 hash.
keyword
dll.hash.sha512
SHA512 hash.
keyword
dll.name
Name of the library. This generally maps to the name of the file on disk.
keyword
dll.path
Full file path of the library.
keyword
dll.pe.company
Internal company name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
dll.pe.description
Internal description of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
dll.pe.file_version
Internal version of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
dll.pe.imphash
A hash of the imports in a PE file. An imphash -- or import hash -- can be used to fingerprint binaries even after recompilation or other code-level transformations have occurred, which would change more traditional hash values. Learn more at https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/01/tracking-malware-import-hashing.html.
keyword
dll.pe.original_file_name
Internal name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
dll.pe.product
Internal product name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
ecs.version
ECS version this event conforms to. ecs.version is a required field and must exist in all events. When querying across multiple indices -- which may conform to slightly different ECS versions -- this field lets integrations adjust to the schema version of the events.
keyword
event.action
The action captured by the event. This describes the information in the event. It is more specific than event.category. Examples are group-add, process-started, file-created. The value is normally defined by the implementer.
keyword
event.category
This is one of four ECS Categorization Fields, and indicates the second level in the ECS category hierarchy. event.category represents the "big buckets" of ECS categories. For example, filtering on event.category:process yields all events relating to process activity. This field is closely related to event.type, which is used as a subcategory. This field is an array. This will allow proper categorization of some events that fall in multiple categories.
keyword
event.code
Identification code for this event, if one exists. Some event sources use event codes to identify messages unambiguously, regardless of message language or wording adjustments over time. An example of this is the Windows Event ID.
keyword
event.created
event.created contains the date/time when the event was first read by an agent, or by your pipeline. This field is distinct from @timestamp in that @timestamp typically contain the time extracted from the original event. In most situations, these two timestamps will be slightly different. The difference can be used to calculate the delay between your source generating an event, and the time when your agent first processed it. This can be used to monitor your agent's or pipeline's ability to keep up with your event source. In case the two timestamps are identical, @timestamp should be used.
date
event.dataset
Name of the dataset. If an event source publishes more than one type of log or events (e.g. access log, error log), the dataset is used to specify which one the event comes from. It's recommended but not required to start the dataset name with the module name, followed by a dot, then the dataset name.
keyword
event.hash
Hash (perhaps logstash fingerprint) of raw field to be able to demonstrate log integrity.
keyword
event.id
Unique ID to describe the event.
keyword
event.ingested
Timestamp when an event arrived in the central data store. This is different from @timestamp, which is when the event originally occurred. It's also different from event.created, which is meant to capture the first time an agent saw the event. In normal conditions, assuming no tampering, the timestamps should chronologically look like this: @timestamp < event.created < event.ingested.
date
event.kind
This is one of four ECS Categorization Fields, and indicates the highest level in the ECS category hierarchy. event.kind gives high-level information about what type of information the event contains, without being specific to the contents of the event. For example, values of this field distinguish alert events from metric events. The value of this field can be used to inform how these kinds of events should be handled. They may warrant different retention, different access control, it may also help understand whether the data coming in at a regular interval or not.
keyword
event.module
Name of the module this data is coming from. If your monitoring agent supports the concept of modules or plugins to process events of a given source (e.g. Apache logs), event.module should contain the name of this module.
keyword
event.outcome
This is one of four ECS Categorization Fields, and indicates the lowest level in the ECS category hierarchy. event.outcome simply denotes whether the event represents a success or a failure from the perspective of the entity that produced the event. Note that when a single transaction is described in multiple events, each event may populate different values of event.outcome, according to their perspective. Also note that in the case of a compound event (a single event that contains multiple logical events), this field should be populated with the value that best captures the overall success or failure from the perspective of the event producer. Further note that not all events will have an associated outcome. For example, this field is generally not populated for metric events, events with event.type:info, or any events for which an outcome does not make logical sense.
keyword
event.provider
Source of the event. Event transports such as Syslog or the Windows Event Log typically mention the source of an event. It can be the name of the software that generated the event (e.g. Sysmon, httpd), or of a subsystem of the operating system (kernel, Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing).
keyword
event.sequence
Sequence number of the event. The sequence number is a value published by some event sources, to make the exact ordering of events unambiguous, regardless of the timestamp precision.
long
event.severity
The numeric severity of the event according to your event source. What the different severity values mean can be different between sources and use cases. It's up to the implementer to make sure severities are consistent across events from the same source. The Syslog severity belongs in log.syslog.severity.code. event.severity is meant to represent the severity according to the event source (e.g. firewall, IDS). If the event source does not publish its own severity, you may optionally copy the log.syslog.severity.code to event.severity.
long
event.type
This is one of four ECS Categorization Fields, and indicates the third level in the ECS category hierarchy. event.type represents a categorization "sub-bucket" that, when used along with the event.category field values, enables filtering events down to a level appropriate for single visualization. This field is an array. This will allow proper categorization of some events that fall in multiple event types.
keyword
file.Ext
Object for all custom defined fields to live in.
object
file.Ext.code_signature
Nested version of ECS code_signature fieldset.
nested
file.Ext.code_signature.exists
Boolean to capture if a signature is present.
boolean
file.Ext.code_signature.status
Additional information about the certificate status. This is useful for logging cryptographic errors with the certificate validity or trust status. Leave unpopulated if the validity or trust of the certificate was unchecked.
keyword
file.Ext.code_signature.subject_name
Subject name of the code signer
keyword
file.Ext.code_signature.trusted
Stores the trust status of the certificate chain. Validating the trust of the certificate chain may be complicated, and this field should only be populated by tools that actively check the status.
boolean
file.Ext.code_signature.valid
Boolean to capture if the digital signature is verified against the binary content. Leave unpopulated if a certificate was unchecked.
boolean
file.hash.md5
MD5 hash.
keyword
file.hash.sha1
SHA1 hash.
keyword
file.hash.sha256
SHA256 hash.
keyword
file.hash.sha512
SHA512 hash.
keyword
file.name
Name of the file including the extension, without the directory.
keyword
file.path
Full path to the file, including the file name. It should include the drive letter, when appropriate.
keyword
file.pe.company
Internal company name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
file.pe.description
Internal description of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
file.pe.file_version
Internal version of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
file.pe.imphash
A hash of the imports in a PE file. An imphash -- or import hash -- can be used to fingerprint binaries even after recompilation or other code-level transformations have occurred, which would change more traditional hash values. Learn more at https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/01/tracking-malware-import-hashing.html.
keyword
file.pe.original_file_name
Internal name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
file.pe.product
Internal product name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
group.Ext
Object for all custom defined fields to live in.
object
group.Ext.real
Group info prior to any setgid operations.
object
group.Ext.real.id
Unique identifier for the group on the system/platform.
keyword
group.Ext.real.name
Name of the group.
keyword
group.domain
Name of the directory the group is a member of. For example, an LDAP or Active Directory domain name.
keyword
group.id
Unique identifier for the group on the system/platform.
keyword
group.name
Name of the group.
keyword
host.architecture
Operating system architecture.
keyword
host.domain
Name of the domain of which the host is a member. For example, on Windows this could be the host's Active Directory domain or NetBIOS domain name. For Linux this could be the domain of the host's LDAP provider.
keyword
host.hostname
Hostname of the host. It normally contains what the hostname command returns on the host machine.
keyword
host.id
Unique host id. As hostname is not always unique, use values that are meaningful in your environment. Example: The current usage of beat.name.
keyword
host.ip
Host ip addresses.
ip
host.mac
Host MAC addresses. The notation format from RFC 7042 is suggested: Each octet (that is, 8-bit byte) is represented by two [uppercase] hexadecimal digits giving the value of the octet as an unsigned integer. Successive octets are separated by a hyphen.
keyword
host.name
Name of the host. It can contain what hostname returns on Unix systems, the fully qualified domain name, or a name specified by the user. The sender decides which value to use.
keyword
host.os.Ext
Object for all custom defined fields to live in.
object
host.os.Ext.variant
A string value or phrase that further aid to classify or qualify the operating system (OS). For example the distribution for a Linux OS will be entered in this field.
keyword
host.os.family
OS family (such as redhat, debian, freebsd, windows).
keyword
host.os.full
Operating system name, including the version or code name.
keyword
host.os.kernel
Operating system kernel version as a raw string.
keyword
host.os.name
Operating system name, without the version.
keyword
host.os.platform
Operating system platform (such centos, ubuntu, windows).
keyword
host.os.version
Operating system version as a raw string.
keyword
host.type
Type of host. For Cloud providers this can be the machine type like t2.medium. If vm, this could be the container, for example, or other information meaningful in your environment.
keyword
host.uptime
Seconds the host has been up.
long
message
For log events the message field contains the log message, optimized for viewing in a log viewer. For structured logs without an original message field, other fields can be concatenated to form a human-readable summary of the event. If multiple messages exist, they can be combined into one message.
text
process.Ext
Object for all custom defined fields to live in.
object
process.Ext.ancestry
An array of entity_ids indicating the ancestors for this event
keyword
process.entity_id
Unique identifier for the process. The implementation of this is specified by the data source, but some examples of what could be used here are a process-generated UUID, Sysmon Process GUIDs, or a hash of some uniquely identifying components of a process. Constructing a globally unique identifier is a common practice to mitigate PID reuse as well as to identify a specific process over time, across multiple monitored hosts.
keyword
process.executable
Absolute path to the process executable.
keyword
process.name
Process name. Sometimes called program name or similar.
keyword
process.pid
Process id.
long
process.thread.id
Thread ID.
long
source.geo.city_name
City name.
keyword
source.geo.continent_code
Two-letter code representing continent's name.
keyword
source.geo.continent_name
Name of the continent.
keyword
source.geo.country_iso_code
Country ISO code.
keyword
source.geo.country_name
Country name.
keyword
source.geo.location
Longitude and latitude.
geo_point
source.geo.name
User-defined description of a location, at the level of granularity they care about. Could be the name of their data centers, the floor number, if this describes a local physical entity, city names. Not typically used in automated geolocation.
keyword
source.geo.postal_code
Postal code associated with the location. Values appropriate for this field may also be known as a postcode or ZIP code and will vary widely from country to country.
keyword
source.geo.region_iso_code
Region ISO code.
keyword
source.geo.region_name
Region name.
keyword
source.geo.timezone
The time zone of the location, such as IANA time zone name.
keyword
user.Ext
Object for all custom defined fields to live in.
object
user.Ext.real
User info prior to any setuid operations.
object
user.Ext.real.id
One or multiple unique identifiers of the user.
keyword
user.Ext.real.name
Short name or login of the user.
keyword
user.domain
Name of the directory the user is a member of. For example, an LDAP or Active Directory domain name.
keyword
user.email
User email address.
keyword
user.full_name
User's full name, if available.
keyword
user.group.Ext
Object for all custom defined fields to live in.
object
user.group.Ext.real
Group info prior to any setgid operations.
object
user.group.Ext.real.id
Unique identifier for the group on the system/platform.
keyword
user.group.Ext.real.name
Name of the group.
keyword
user.group.domain
Name of the directory the group is a member of. For example, an LDAP or Active Directory domain name.
keyword
user.group.id
Unique identifier for the group on the system/platform.
keyword
user.group.name
Name of the group.
keyword
user.hash
Unique user hash to correlate information for a user in anonymized form. Useful if user.id or user.name contain confidential information and cannot be used.
keyword
user.id
Unique identifier of the user.
keyword
user.name
Short name or login of the user.
keyword

network

Exported fields

FieldDescriptionType
@timestamp
Date/time when the event originated. This is the date/time extracted from the event, typically representing when the event was generated by the source. If the event source has no original timestamp, this value is typically populated by the first time the event was received by the pipeline. Required field for all events.
date
agent.id
Unique identifier of this agent (if one exists). Example: For Beats this would be beat.id.
keyword
agent.type
Type of the agent. The agent type always stays the same and should be given by the agent used. In case of Filebeat the agent would always be Filebeat also if two Filebeat instances are run on the same machine.
keyword
agent.version
Version of the agent.
keyword
data_stream.dataset
Data stream dataset name.
constant_keyword
data_stream.namespace
Data stream namespace.
constant_keyword
data_stream.type
Data stream type.
constant_keyword
destination.address
Some event destination addresses are defined ambiguously. The event will sometimes list an IP, a domain or a unix socket. You should always store the raw address in the .address field. Then it should be duplicated to .ip or .domain, depending on which one it is.
keyword
destination.bytes
Bytes sent from the destination to the source.
long
destination.domain
Destination domain.
keyword
destination.geo.city_name
City name.
keyword
destination.geo.continent_code
Two-letter code representing continent's name.
keyword
destination.geo.continent_name
Name of the continent.
keyword
destination.geo.country_iso_code
Country ISO code.
keyword
destination.geo.country_name
Country name.
keyword
destination.geo.location
Longitude and latitude.
geo_point
destination.geo.name
User-defined description of a location, at the level of granularity they care about. Could be the name of their data centers, the floor number, if this describes a local physical entity, city names. Not typically used in automated geolocation.
keyword
destination.geo.postal_code
Postal code associated with the location. Values appropriate for this field may also be known as a postcode or ZIP code and will vary widely from country to country.
keyword
destination.geo.region_iso_code
Region ISO code.
keyword
destination.geo.region_name
Region name.
keyword
destination.geo.timezone
The time zone of the location, such as IANA time zone name.
keyword
destination.ip
IP address of the destination (IPv4 or IPv6).
ip
destination.packets
Packets sent from the destination to the source.
long
destination.port
Port of the destination.
long
destination.registered_domain
The highest registered destination domain, stripped of the subdomain. For example, the registered domain for "foo.example.com" is "example.com". This value can be determined precisely with a list like the public suffix list (http://publicsuffix.org). Trying to approximate this by simply taking the last two labels will not work well for TLDs such as "co.uk".
keyword
destination.top_level_domain
The effective top level domain (eTLD), also known as the domain suffix, is the last part of the domain name. For example, the top level domain for example.com is "com". This value can be determined precisely with a list like the public suffix list (http://publicsuffix.org). Trying to approximate this by simply taking the last label will not work well for effective TLDs such as "co.uk".
keyword
dns.Ext
Object for all custom defined fields to live in.
object
dns.Ext.options
DNS options field, uint64, representing as a keyword to avoid overflows in ES
keyword
dns.Ext.status
DNS status field, uint32
long
dns.question.name
The name being queried. If the name field contains non-printable characters (below 32 or above 126), those characters should be represented as escaped base 10 integers (\DDD). Back slashes and quotes should be escaped. Tabs, carriage returns, and line feeds should be converted to \t, \r, and \n respectively.
keyword
dns.question.registered_domain
The highest registered domain, stripped of the subdomain. For example, the registered domain for "foo.example.com" is "example.com". This value can be determined precisely with a list like the public suffix list (http://publicsuffix.org). Trying to approximate this by simply taking the last two labels will not work well for TLDs such as "co.uk".
keyword
dns.question.subdomain
The subdomain is all of the labels under the registered_domain. If the domain has multiple levels of subdomain, such as "sub2.sub1.example.com", the subdomain field should contain "sub2.sub1", with no trailing period.
keyword
dns.question.top_level_domain
The effective top level domain (eTLD), also known as the domain suffix, is the last part of the domain name. For example, the top level domain for example.com is "com". This value can be determined precisely with a list like the public suffix list (http://publicsuffix.org). Trying to approximate this by simply taking the last label will not work well for effective TLDs such as "co.uk".
keyword
dns.question.type
The type of record being queried.
keyword
dns.resolved_ip
Array containing all IPs seen in answers.data. The answers array can be difficult to use, because of the variety of data formats it can contain. Extracting all IP addresses seen in there to dns.resolved_ip makes it possible to index them as IP addresses, and makes them easier to visualize and query for.
ip
ecs.version
ECS version this event conforms to. ecs.version is a required field and must exist in all events. When querying across multiple indices -- which may conform to slightly different ECS versions -- this field lets integrations adjust to the schema version of the events.
keyword
event.action
The action captured by the event. This describes the information in the event. It is more specific than event.category. Examples are group-add, process-started, file-created. The value is normally defined by the implementer.
keyword
event.category
This is one of four ECS Categorization Fields, and indicates the second level in the ECS category hierarchy. event.category represents the "big buckets" of ECS categories. For example, filtering on event.category:process yields all events relating to process activity. This field is closely related to event.type, which is used as a subcategory. This field is an array. This will allow proper categorization of some events that fall in multiple categories.
keyword
event.code
Identification code for this event, if one exists. Some event sources use event codes to identify messages unambiguously, regardless of message language or wording adjustments over time. An example of this is the Windows Event ID.
keyword
event.created
event.created contains the date/time when the event was first read by an agent, or by your pipeline. This field is distinct from @timestamp in that @timestamp typically contain the time extracted from the original event. In most situations, these two timestamps will be slightly different. The difference can be used to calculate the delay between your source generating an event, and the time when your agent first processed it. This can be used to monitor your agent's or pipeline's ability to keep up with your event source. In case the two timestamps are identical, @timestamp should be used.
date
event.dataset
Name of the dataset. If an event source publishes more than one type of log or events (e.g. access log, error log), the dataset is used to specify which one the event comes from. It's recommended but not required to start the dataset name with the module name, followed by a dot, then the dataset name.
keyword
event.hash
Hash (perhaps logstash fingerprint) of raw field to be able to demonstrate log integrity.
keyword
event.id
Unique ID to describe the event.
keyword
event.ingested
Timestamp when an event arrived in the central data store. This is different from @timestamp, which is when the event originally occurred. It's also different from event.created, which is meant to capture the first time an agent saw the event. In normal conditions, assuming no tampering, the timestamps should chronologically look like this: @timestamp < event.created < event.ingested.
date
event.kind
This is one of four ECS Categorization Fields, and indicates the highest level in the ECS category hierarchy. event.kind gives high-level information about what type of information the event contains, without being specific to the contents of the event. For example, values of this field distinguish alert events from metric events. The value of this field can be used to inform how these kinds of events should be handled. They may warrant different retention, different access control, it may also help understand whether the data coming in at a regular interval or not.
keyword
event.module
Name of the module this data is coming from. If your monitoring agent supports the concept of modules or plugins to process events of a given source (e.g. Apache logs), event.module should contain the name of this module.
keyword
event.outcome
This is one of four ECS Categorization Fields, and indicates the lowest level in the ECS category hierarchy. event.outcome simply denotes whether the event represents a success or a failure from the perspective of the entity that produced the event. Note that when a single transaction is described in multiple events, each event may populate different values of event.outcome, according to their perspective. Also note that in the case of a compound event (a single event that contains multiple logical events), this field should be populated with the value that best captures the overall success or failure from the perspective of the event producer. Further note that not all events will have an associated outcome. For example, this field is generally not populated for metric events, events with event.type:info, or any events for which an outcome does not make logical sense.
keyword
event.provider
Source of the event. Event transports such as Syslog or the Windows Event Log typically mention the source of an event. It can be the name of the software that generated the event (e.g. Sysmon, httpd), or of a subsystem of the operating system (kernel, Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing).
keyword
event.sequence
Sequence number of the event. The sequence number is a value published by some event sources, to make the exact ordering of events unambiguous, regardless of the timestamp precision.
long
event.severity
The numeric severity of the event according to your event source. What the different severity values mean can be different between sources and use cases. It's up to the implementer to make sure severities are consistent across events from the same source. The Syslog severity belongs in log.syslog.severity.code. event.severity is meant to represent the severity according to the event source (e.g. firewall, IDS). If the event source does not publish its own severity, you may optionally copy the log.syslog.severity.code to event.severity.
long
event.type
This is one of four ECS Categorization Fields, and indicates the third level in the ECS category hierarchy. event.type represents a categorization "sub-bucket" that, when used along with the event.category field values, enables filtering events down to a level appropriate for single visualization. This field is an array. This will allow proper categorization of some events that fall in multiple event types.
keyword
group.Ext
Object for all custom defined fields to live in.
object
group.Ext.real
Group info prior to any setgid operations.
object
group.Ext.real.id
Unique identifier for the group on the system/platform.
keyword
group.Ext.real.name
Name of the group.
keyword
group.domain
Name of the directory the group is a member of. For example, an LDAP or Active Directory domain name.
keyword
group.id
Unique identifier for the group on the system/platform.
keyword
group.name
Name of the group.
keyword
host.architecture
Operating system architecture.
keyword
host.domain
Name of the domain of which the host is a member. For example, on Windows this could be the host's Active Directory domain or NetBIOS domain name. For Linux this could be the domain of the host's LDAP provider.
keyword
host.hostname
Hostname of the host. It normally contains what the hostname command returns on the host machine.
keyword
host.id
Unique host id. As hostname is not always unique, use values that are meaningful in your environment. Example: The current usage of beat.name.
keyword
host.ip
Host ip addresses.
ip
host.mac
Host MAC addresses. The notation format from RFC 7042 is suggested: Each octet (that is, 8-bit byte) is represented by two [uppercase] hexadecimal digits giving the value of the octet as an unsigned integer. Successive octets are separated by a hyphen.
keyword
host.name
Name of the host. It can contain what hostname returns on Unix systems, the fully qualified domain name, or a name specified by the user. The sender decides which value to use.
keyword
host.os.Ext
Object for all custom defined fields to live in.
object
host.os.Ext.variant
A string value or phrase that further aid to classify or qualify the operating system (OS). For example the distribution for a Linux OS will be entered in this field.
keyword
host.os.family
OS family (such as redhat, debian, freebsd, windows).
keyword
host.os.full
Operating system name, including the version or code name.
keyword
host.os.kernel
Operating system kernel version as a raw string.
keyword
host.os.name
Operating system name, without the version.
keyword
host.os.platform
Operating system platform (such centos, ubuntu, windows).
keyword
host.os.version
Operating system version as a raw string.
keyword
host.type
Type of host. For Cloud providers this can be the machine type like t2.medium. If vm, this could be the container, for example, or other information meaningful in your environment.
keyword
host.uptime
Seconds the host has been up.
long
http.request.body.bytes
Size in bytes of the request body.
long
http.request.body.content
The full HTTP request body.
keyword
http.request.bytes
Total size in bytes of the request (body and headers).
long
http.response.Ext
Object for all custom defined fields to live in.
object
http.response.Ext.version
HTTP version
keyword
http.response.body.bytes
Size in bytes of the response body.
long
http.response.body.content
The full HTTP response body.
keyword
http.response.bytes
Total size in bytes of the response (body and headers).
long
http.response.status_code
HTTP response status code.
long
message
For log events the message field contains the log message, optimized for viewing in a log viewer. For structured logs without an original message field, other fields can be concatenated to form a human-readable summary of the event. If multiple messages exist, they can be combined into one message.
text
network.bytes
Total bytes transferred in both directions. If source.bytes and destination.bytes are known, network.bytes is their sum.
long
network.community_id
A hash of source and destination IPs and ports, as well as the protocol used in a communication. This is a tool-agnostic standard to identify flows. Learn more at https://github.com/corelight/community-id-spec.
keyword
network.direction
Direction of the network traffic. Recommended values are: * ingress * egress * inbound * outbound * internal * external * unknown When mapping events from a host-based monitoring context, populate this field from the host's point of view, using the values "ingress" or "egress". When mapping events from a network or perimeter-based monitoring context, populate this field from the point of view of the network perimeter, using the values "inbound", "outbound", "internal" or "external". Note that "internal" is not crossing perimeter boundaries, and is meant to describe communication between two hosts within the perimeter. Note also that "external" is meant to describe traffic between two hosts that are external to the perimeter. This could for example be useful for ISPs or VPN service providers.
keyword
network.iana_number
IANA Protocol Number (https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/protocol-numbers.xhtml). Standardized list of protocols. This aligns well with NetFlow and sFlow related logs which use the IANA Protocol Number.
keyword
network.packets
Total packets transferred in both directions. If source.packets and destination.packets are known, network.packets is their sum.
long
network.protocol
L7 Network protocol name. ex. http, lumberjack, transport protocol. The field value must be normalized to lowercase for querying. See the documentation section "Implementing ECS".
keyword
network.transport
Same as network.iana_number, but instead using the Keyword name of the transport layer (udp, tcp, ipv6-icmp, etc.) The field value must be normalized to lowercase for querying. See the documentation section "Implementing ECS".
keyword
network.type
In the OSI Model this would be the Network Layer. ipv4, ipv6, ipsec, pim, etc The field value must be normalized to lowercase for querying. See the documentation section "Implementing ECS".
keyword
process.Ext
Object for all custom defined fields to live in.
object
process.Ext.ancestry
An array of entity_ids indicating the ancestors for this event
keyword
process.entity_id
Unique identifier for the process. The implementation of this is specified by the data source, but some examples of what could be used here are a process-generated UUID, Sysmon Process GUIDs, or a hash of some uniquely identifying components of a process. Constructing a globally unique identifier is a common practice to mitigate PID reuse as well as to identify a specific process over time, across multiple monitored hosts.
keyword
process.executable
Absolute path to the process executable.
keyword
process.name
Process name. Sometimes called program name or similar.
keyword
process.pid
Process id.
long
process.thread.id
Thread ID.
long
source.address
Some event source addresses are defined ambiguously. The event will sometimes list an IP, a domain or a unix socket. You should always store the raw address in the .address field. Then it should be duplicated to .ip or .domain, depending on which one it is.
keyword
source.bytes
Bytes sent from the source to the destination.
long
source.domain
Source domain.
keyword
source.geo.city_name
City name.
keyword
source.geo.continent_code
Two-letter code representing continent's name.
keyword
source.geo.continent_name
Name of the continent.
keyword
source.geo.country_iso_code
Country ISO code.
keyword
source.geo.country_name
Country name.
keyword
source.geo.location
Longitude and latitude.
geo_point
source.geo.name
User-defined description of a location, at the level of granularity they care about. Could be the name of their data centers, the floor number, if this describes a local physical entity, city names. Not typically used in automated geolocation.
keyword
source.geo.postal_code
Postal code associated with the location. Values appropriate for this field may also be known as a postcode or ZIP code and will vary widely from country to country.
keyword
source.geo.region_iso_code
Region ISO code.
keyword
source.geo.region_name
Region name.
keyword
source.geo.timezone
The time zone of the location, such as IANA time zone name.
keyword
source.ip
IP address of the source (IPv4 or IPv6).
ip
source.packets
Packets sent from the source to the destination.
long
source.port
Port of the source.
long
source.registered_domain
The highest registered source domain, stripped of the subdomain. For example, the registered domain for "foo.example.com" is "example.com". This value can be determined precisely with a list like the public suffix list (http://publicsuffix.org). Trying to approximate this by simply taking the last two labels will not work well for TLDs such as "co.uk".
keyword
source.top_level_domain
The effective top level domain (eTLD), also known as the domain suffix, is the last part of the domain name. For example, the top level domain for example.com is "com". This value can be determined precisely with a list like the public suffix list (http://publicsuffix.org). Trying to approximate this by simply taking the last label will not work well for effective TLDs such as "co.uk".
keyword
user.Ext
Object for all custom defined fields to live in.
object
user.Ext.real
User info prior to any setuid operations.
object
user.Ext.real.id
One or multiple unique identifiers of the user.
keyword
user.Ext.real.name
Short name or login of the user.
keyword
user.domain
Name of the directory the user is a member of. For example, an LDAP or Active Directory domain name.
keyword
user.email
User email address.
keyword
user.full_name
User's full name, if available.
keyword
user.group.Ext
Object for all custom defined fields to live in.
object
user.group.Ext.real
Group info prior to any setgid operations.
object
user.group.Ext.real.id
Unique identifier for the group on the system/platform.
keyword
user.group.Ext.real.name
Name of the group.
keyword
user.group.domain
Name of the directory the group is a member of. For example, an LDAP or Active Directory domain name.
keyword
user.group.id
Unique identifier for the group on the system/platform.
keyword
user.group.name
Name of the group.
keyword
user.hash
Unique user hash to correlate information for a user in anonymized form. Useful if user.id or user.name contain confidential information and cannot be used.
keyword
user.id
Unique identifier of the user.
keyword
user.name
Short name or login of the user.
keyword

process

Exported fields

FieldDescriptionType
@timestamp
Date/time when the event originated. This is the date/time extracted from the event, typically representing when the event was generated by the source. If the event source has no original timestamp, this value is typically populated by the first time the event was received by the pipeline. Required field for all events.
date
agent.id
Unique identifier of this agent (if one exists). Example: For Beats this would be beat.id.
keyword
agent.type
Type of the agent. The agent type always stays the same and should be given by the agent used. In case of Filebeat the agent would always be Filebeat also if two Filebeat instances are run on the same machine.
keyword
agent.version
Version of the agent.
keyword
data_stream.dataset
Data stream dataset name.
constant_keyword
data_stream.namespace
Data stream namespace.
constant_keyword
data_stream.type
Data stream type.
constant_keyword
destination.geo.city_name
City name.
keyword
destination.geo.continent_code
Two-letter code representing continent's name.
keyword
destination.geo.continent_name
Name of the continent.
keyword
destination.geo.country_iso_code
Country ISO code.
keyword
destination.geo.country_name
Country name.
keyword
destination.geo.location
Longitude and latitude.
geo_point
destination.geo.name
User-defined description of a location, at the level of granularity they care about. Could be the name of their data centers, the floor number, if this describes a local physical entity, city names. Not typically used in automated geolocation.
keyword
destination.geo.postal_code
Postal code associated with the location. Values appropriate for this field may also be known as a postcode or ZIP code and will vary widely from country to country.
keyword
destination.geo.region_iso_code
Region ISO code.
keyword
destination.geo.region_name
Region name.
keyword
destination.geo.timezone
The time zone of the location, such as IANA time zone name.
keyword
ecs.version
ECS version this event conforms to. ecs.version is a required field and must exist in all events. When querying across multiple indices -- which may conform to slightly different ECS versions -- this field lets integrations adjust to the schema version of the events.
keyword
event.action
The action captured by the event. This describes the information in the event. It is more specific than event.category. Examples are group-add, process-started, file-created. The value is normally defined by the implementer.
keyword
event.category
This is one of four ECS Categorization Fields, and indicates the second level in the ECS category hierarchy. event.category represents the "big buckets" of ECS categories. For example, filtering on event.category:process yields all events relating to process activity. This field is closely related to event.type, which is used as a subcategory. This field is an array. This will allow proper categorization of some events that fall in multiple categories.
keyword
event.code
Identification code for this event, if one exists. Some event sources use event codes to identify messages unambiguously, regardless of message language or wording adjustments over time. An example of this is the Windows Event ID.
keyword
event.created
event.created contains the date/time when the event was first read by an agent, or by your pipeline. This field is distinct from @timestamp in that @timestamp typically contain the time extracted from the original event. In most situations, these two timestamps will be slightly different. The difference can be used to calculate the delay between your source generating an event, and the time when your agent first processed it. This can be used to monitor your agent's or pipeline's ability to keep up with your event source. In case the two timestamps are identical, @timestamp should be used.
date
event.dataset
Name of the dataset. If an event source publishes more than one type of log or events (e.g. access log, error log), the dataset is used to specify which one the event comes from. It's recommended but not required to start the dataset name with the module name, followed by a dot, then the dataset name.
keyword
event.hash
Hash (perhaps logstash fingerprint) of raw field to be able to demonstrate log integrity.
keyword
event.id
Unique ID to describe the event.
keyword
event.ingested
Timestamp when an event arrived in the central data store. This is different from @timestamp, which is when the event originally occurred. It's also different from event.created, which is meant to capture the first time an agent saw the event. In normal conditions, assuming no tampering, the timestamps should chronologically look like this: @timestamp < event.created < event.ingested.
date
event.kind
This is one of four ECS Categorization Fields, and indicates the highest level in the ECS category hierarchy. event.kind gives high-level information about what type of information the event contains, without being specific to the contents of the event. For example, values of this field distinguish alert events from metric events. The value of this field can be used to inform how these kinds of events should be handled. They may warrant different retention, different access control, it may also help understand whether the data coming in at a regular interval or not.
keyword
event.module
Name of the module this data is coming from. If your monitoring agent supports the concept of modules or plugins to process events of a given source (e.g. Apache logs), event.module should contain the name of this module.
keyword
event.outcome
This is one of four ECS Categorization Fields, and indicates the lowest level in the ECS category hierarchy. event.outcome simply denotes whether the event represents a success or a failure from the perspective of the entity that produced the event. Note that when a single transaction is described in multiple events, each event may populate different values of event.outcome, according to their perspective. Also note that in the case of a compound event (a single event that contains multiple logical events), this field should be populated with the value that best captures the overall success or failure from the perspective of the event producer. Further note that not all events will have an associated outcome. For example, this field is generally not populated for metric events, events with event.type:info, or any events for which an outcome does not make logical sense.
keyword
event.provider
Source of the event. Event transports such as Syslog or the Windows Event Log typically mention the source of an event. It can be the name of the software that generated the event (e.g. Sysmon, httpd), or of a subsystem of the operating system (kernel, Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing).
keyword
event.sequence
Sequence number of the event. The sequence number is a value published by some event sources, to make the exact ordering of events unambiguous, regardless of the timestamp precision.
long
event.severity
The numeric severity of the event according to your event source. What the different severity values mean can be different between sources and use cases. It's up to the implementer to make sure severities are consistent across events from the same source. The Syslog severity belongs in log.syslog.severity.code. event.severity is meant to represent the severity according to the event source (e.g. firewall, IDS). If the event source does not publish its own severity, you may optionally copy the log.syslog.severity.code to event.severity.
long
event.type
This is one of four ECS Categorization Fields, and indicates the third level in the ECS category hierarchy. event.type represents a categorization "sub-bucket" that, when used along with the event.category field values, enables filtering events down to a level appropriate for single visualization. This field is an array. This will allow proper categorization of some events that fall in multiple event types.
keyword
group.Ext
Object for all custom defined fields to live in.
object
group.Ext.real
Group info prior to any setgid operations.
object
group.Ext.real.id
Unique identifier for the group on the system/platform.
keyword
group.Ext.real.name
Name of the group.
keyword
group.domain
Name of the directory the group is a member of. For example, an LDAP or Active Directory domain name.
keyword
group.id
Unique identifier for the group on the system/platform.
keyword
group.name
Name of the group.
keyword
host.architecture
Operating system architecture.
keyword
host.domain
Name of the domain of which the host is a member. For example, on Windows this could be the host's Active Directory domain or NetBIOS domain name. For Linux this could be the domain of the host's LDAP provider.
keyword
host.hostname
Hostname of the host. It normally contains what the hostname command returns on the host machine.
keyword
host.id
Unique host id. As hostname is not always unique, use values that are meaningful in your environment. Example: The current usage of beat.name.
keyword
host.ip
Host ip addresses.
ip
host.mac
Host MAC addresses. The notation format from RFC 7042 is suggested: Each octet (that is, 8-bit byte) is represented by two [uppercase] hexadecimal digits giving the value of the octet as an unsigned integer. Successive octets are separated by a hyphen.
keyword
host.name
Name of the host. It can contain what hostname returns on Unix systems, the fully qualified domain name, or a name specified by the user. The sender decides which value to use.
keyword
host.os.Ext
Object for all custom defined fields to live in.
object
host.os.Ext.variant
A string value or phrase that further aid to classify or qualify the operating system (OS). For example the distribution for a Linux OS will be entered in this field.
keyword
host.os.family
OS family (such as redhat, debian, freebsd, windows).
keyword
host.os.full
Operating system name, including the version or code name.
keyword
host.os.kernel
Operating system kernel version as a raw string.
keyword
host.os.name
Operating system name, without the version.
keyword
host.os.platform
Operating system platform (such centos, ubuntu, windows).
keyword
host.os.version
Operating system version as a raw string.
keyword
host.type
Type of host. For Cloud providers this can be the machine type like t2.medium. If vm, this could be the container, for example, or other information meaningful in your environment.
keyword
host.uptime
Seconds the host has been up.
long
message
For log events the message field contains the log message, optimized for viewing in a log viewer. For structured logs without an original message field, other fields can be concatenated to form a human-readable summary of the event. If multiple messages exist, they can be combined into one message.
text
package.name
Package name
keyword
process.Ext
Object for all custom defined fields to live in.
object
process.Ext.ancestry
An array of entity_ids indicating the ancestors for this event
keyword
process.Ext.architecture
Process architecture. It can differ from host architecture.
keyword
process.Ext.authentication_id
Process authentication ID
keyword
process.Ext.code_signature
Nested version of ECS code_signature fieldset.
nested
process.Ext.code_signature.exists
Boolean to capture if a signature is present.
boolean
process.Ext.code_signature.status
Additional information about the certificate status. This is useful for logging cryptographic errors with the certificate validity or trust status. Leave unpopulated if the validity or trust of the certificate was unchecked.
keyword
process.Ext.code_signature.subject_name
Subject name of the code signer
keyword
process.Ext.code_signature.trusted
Stores the trust status of the certificate chain. Validating the trust of the certificate chain may be complicated, and this field should only be populated by tools that actively check the status.
boolean
process.Ext.code_signature.valid
Boolean to capture if the digital signature is verified against the binary content. Leave unpopulated if a certificate was unchecked.
boolean
process.Ext.defense_evasions
List of defense evasions found in this process. These defense evasions can make it harder to inspect a process and/or cause abnormal OS behavior. Examples tools that can cause defense evasions include Process Doppelganging and Process Herpaderping.
keyword
process.Ext.dll.Ext
Object for all custom defined fields to live in.
object
process.Ext.dll.Ext.mapped_address
The base address where this module is loaded.
unsigned_long
process.Ext.dll.Ext.mapped_size
The size of this module's memory mapping, in bytes.
unsigned_long
process.Ext.dll.name
Name of the library. This generally maps to the name of the file on disk.
keyword
process.Ext.dll.path
Full file path of the library.
keyword
process.Ext.protection
Indicates the protection level of this process. Uses the same syntax as Process Explorer. Examples include PsProtectedSignerWinTcb, PsProtectedSignerWinTcb-Light, and PsProtectedSignerWindows-Light.
keyword
process.Ext.session
Session information for the current process
keyword
process.Ext.token.elevation
Whether the token is elevated or not
boolean
process.Ext.token.elevation_level
What level of elevation the token has
keyword
process.Ext.token.elevation_type
What level of elevation the token has
keyword
process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name
Human readable integrity level.
keyword
process.args
Array of process arguments, starting with the absolute path to the executable. May be filtered to protect sensitive information.
keyword
process.args_count
Length of the process.args array. This field can be useful for querying or performing bucket analysis on how many arguments were provided to start a process. More arguments may be an indication of suspicious activity.
long
process.code_signature.exists
Boolean to capture if a signature is present.
boolean
process.code_signature.signing_id
The identifier used to sign the process. This is used to identify the application manufactured by a software vendor. The field is relevant to Apple *OS only.
keyword
process.code_signature.status
Additional information about the certificate status. This is useful for logging cryptographic errors with the certificate validity or trust status. Leave unpopulated if the validity or trust of the certificate was unchecked.
keyword
process.code_signature.subject_name
Subject name of the code signer
keyword
process.code_signature.team_id
The team identifier used to sign the process. This is used to identify the team or vendor of a software product. The field is relevant to Apple *OS only.
keyword
process.code_signature.trusted
Stores the trust status of the certificate chain. Validating the trust of the certificate chain may be complicated, and this field should only be populated by tools that actively check the status.
boolean
process.code_signature.valid
Boolean to capture if the digital signature is verified against the binary content. Leave unpopulated if a certificate was unchecked.
boolean
process.command_line
Full command line that started the process, including the absolute path to the executable, and all arguments. Some arguments may be filtered to protect sensitive information.
keyword
process.entity_id
Unique identifier for the process. The implementation of this is specified by the data source, but some examples of what could be used here are a process-generated UUID, Sysmon Process GUIDs, or a hash of some uniquely identifying components of a process. Constructing a globally unique identifier is a common practice to mitigate PID reuse as well as to identify a specific process over time, across multiple monitored hosts.
keyword
process.executable
Absolute path to the process executable.
keyword
process.exit_code
The exit code of the process, if this is a termination event. The field should be absent if there is no exit code for the event (e.g. process start).
long
process.hash.md5
MD5 hash.
keyword
process.hash.sha1
SHA1 hash.
keyword
process.hash.sha256
SHA256 hash.
keyword
process.hash.sha512
SHA512 hash.
keyword
process.name
Process name. Sometimes called program name or similar.
keyword
process.parent.Ext
Object for all custom defined fields to live in.
object
process.parent.Ext.architecture
Process architecture. It can differ from host architecture.
keyword
process.parent.Ext.code_signature
Nested version of ECS code_signature fieldset.
nested
process.parent.Ext.code_signature.exists
Boolean to capture if a signature is present.
boolean
process.parent.Ext.code_signature.status
Additional information about the certificate status. This is useful for logging cryptographic errors with the certificate validity or trust status. Leave unpopulated if the validity or trust of the certificate was unchecked.
keyword
process.parent.Ext.code_signature.subject_name
Subject name of the code signer
keyword
process.parent.Ext.code_signature.trusted
Stores the trust status of the certificate chain. Validating the trust of the certificate chain may be complicated, and this field should only be populated by tools that actively check the status.
boolean
process.parent.Ext.code_signature.valid
Boolean to capture if the digital signature is verified against the binary content. Leave unpopulated if a certificate was unchecked.
boolean
process.parent.Ext.protection
Indicates the protection level of this process. Uses the same syntax as Process Explorer. Examples include PsProtectedSignerWinTcb, PsProtectedSignerWinTcb-Light, and PsProtectedSignerWindows-Light.
keyword
process.parent.Ext.real
The field set containing process info in case of any pid spoofing. This is mainly useful for process.parent.
object
process.parent.Ext.real.pid
For process.parent this will be the ppid of the process that actually spawned the current process.
long
process.parent.Ext.user
User associated with the running process.
keyword
process.parent.args
Array of process arguments, starting with the absolute path to the executable. May be filtered to protect sensitive information.
keyword
process.parent.args_count
Length of the process.args array. This field can be useful for querying or performing bucket analysis on how many arguments were provided to start a process. More arguments may be an indication of suspicious activity.
long
process.parent.code_signature.exists
Boolean to capture if a signature is present.
boolean
process.parent.code_signature.signing_id
The identifier used to sign the process. This is used to identify the application manufactured by a software vendor. The field is relevant to Apple *OS only.
keyword
process.parent.code_signature.status
Additional information about the certificate status. This is useful for logging cryptographic errors with the certificate validity or trust status. Leave unpopulated if the validity or trust of the certificate was unchecked.
keyword
process.parent.code_signature.subject_name
Subject name of the code signer
keyword
process.parent.code_signature.team_id
The team identifier used to sign the process. This is used to identify the team or vendor of a software product. The field is relevant to Apple *OS only.
keyword
process.parent.code_signature.trusted
Stores the trust status of the certificate chain. Validating the trust of the certificate chain may be complicated, and this field should only be populated by tools that actively check the status.
boolean
process.parent.code_signature.valid
Boolean to capture if the digital signature is verified against the binary content. Leave unpopulated if a certificate was unchecked.
boolean
process.parent.command_line
Full command line that started the process, including the absolute path to the executable, and all arguments. Some arguments may be filtered to protect sensitive information.
keyword
process.parent.entity_id
Unique identifier for the process. The implementation of this is specified by the data source, but some examples of what could be used here are a process-generated UUID, Sysmon Process GUIDs, or a hash of some uniquely identifying components of a process. Constructing a globally unique identifier is a common practice to mitigate PID reuse as well as to identify a specific process over time, across multiple monitored hosts.
keyword
process.parent.executable
Absolute path to the process executable.
keyword
process.parent.exit_code
The exit code of the process, if this is a termination event. The field should be absent if there is no exit code for the event (e.g. process start).
long
process.parent.hash.md5
MD5 hash.
keyword
process.parent.hash.sha1
SHA1 hash.
keyword
process.parent.hash.sha256
SHA256 hash.
keyword
process.parent.hash.sha512
SHA512 hash.
keyword
process.parent.name
Process name. Sometimes called program name or similar.
keyword
process.parent.pe.company
Internal company name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
process.parent.pe.description
Internal description of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
process.parent.pe.file_version
Internal version of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
process.parent.pe.imphash
A hash of the imports in a PE file. An imphash -- or import hash -- can be used to fingerprint binaries even after recompilation or other code-level transformations have occurred, which would change more traditional hash values. Learn more at https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/01/tracking-malware-import-hashing.html.
keyword
process.parent.pe.original_file_name
Internal name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
process.parent.pe.product
Internal product name of the file, provided at compile-time.
keyword
process.parent.pgid
Identifier of the group of processes the process belongs to.
long
process.parent.pid
Process id.
long
process.parent.ppid
Parent process' pid.
long
process.parent.thread.id
Thread ID.
long
process.parent.thread.name
Thread name.
keyword
process.parent.title
Process title. The proctitle, some times the same as process name. Can also be different: for example a browser setting its title to the web page currently opened.
keyword
process.parent.uptime
Seconds the process has been up.
long